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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter analyzes tensions between marriage equality and religious freedom
in the United States using three organizing frameworks. The first, congruence
and conflict, highlights a common premise within religious objections to samesex marriage: namely, that laws and policies should reflect citizens’ religious
virtues, creating a congruence between civil society and government. In
contrast, the second framework posits a distinction between civil and religious
marriage—“civil marriage” as a secular legal category designating an equally
accessible public institution, and “religious marriage” as a feature of private
morality without the force of law. By heeding this distinction, the chapter
argues, marriage equality and religious liberty become compatible. The third
framework addresses the role of moral disapproval in justifying discriminatory
laws. Chronicling constitutional jurisprudence on liberty and equality, it is
argued that appeals to upholding traditional morality are not sufficient to justify
legislative classifications that disadvantage persons on the basis of sexual
orientation.
Keywords: religious liberty, equality, same-sex marriage, marriage equality, civil marriage, moral
disapproval, DOMA, Prop 8, Supreme Court, law
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Introduction
Does access by gay men and lesbians to civil marriage—to use a common term,
marriage equality—threaten religious liberty? Is marriage equality, along with its
consequences for civil law, in direct tension with the religious freedom of
persons who oppose it on religious grounds? If so, are exemptions from those
civil laws appropriate? Does marriage equality pose a greater or lesser threat
depending upon whether it results from successful constitutional litigation
brought by same-sex couples or from a state law duly enacted by a
democratically elected legislature and signed by an elected governor?
Conversely, is it constitutionally problematic if “the people,” through the ballot
initiative or referendum process, (p.88) take measures to prevent or, in some
instances, override this marriage equality? Finally, what role does or should
moral disapproval of homosexuality and of same-sex marriage play in public
deliberation and decision-making about the quest for marriage equality?
This chapter situates these questions about marriage equality and religious
liberty in the context of developments within the United States. I will offer three
organizing frameworks for considering these questions. One framework is
congruence and conflict, that is, the basic tension in the US constitutional order
between two important ideas about the relationship between civil society and
government: (1) families, religious institutions, and other voluntary associations
of civil society are foundational sources or “seedbeds” of virtues and values that
undergird—and are congruent with—constitutional democracy, and yet (2) these
same nongovernmental entities are independent locations of power and
authority that guard against governmental orthodoxy by generating their own
distinctive virtues and values, which may conflict with public norms. I will
explain how this framework helps to evaluate claims that marriage equality
threatens religious liberty.
A second, related framework is the distinction between civil and religious
marriage in US family law. Claims that marriage equality threatens religious
liberty often blur—or reject—the distinction between civil and religious marriage
and insist that the two must be congruent. Conversely, recognizing the
distinction between civil and religious marriage helps make sense of the claim
that marriage equality is compatible with religious liberty.
A third framework is the role of moral argument and, more precisely, moral
disapproval, in justifying the law concerning civil marriage. This framework
requires a grounding in the relevant United States constitutional jurisprudence
concerning liberty and equality and its evolution in the last few decades, in the
US Supreme Court’s Romer v. Evans (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003),
toward a more critical examination of appeals to upholding traditional morality
as a justification for legislative classifications that disadvantage persons based
on their homosexuality. The precedents set in Romer and Lawrence rule out
“animus” or a “bare desire to harm” as a rationale for such legislation. This
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jurisprudence is at the core of litigation over marriage equality in state and
federal courts. Another crucial precedent in which the Court limited the role of
“moral disapproval of homosexuality” as a justification for legislation is United
States v. Windsor (2013), in which the Supreme Court (in a 5-4 opinion) struck
down part of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).1 Although Windsor formally
ruled only on the constitutionality of a federal ban on recognizing marriages
valid under state law, numerous federal district and appellate courts found
Windsor’s reasoning equally applicable and persuasive with respect to state
bans on marriage by same-sex couples (p.89) or on the recognition of such
marriages, holding that such laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment; only one
federal court of appeals—the Sixth Circuit—ruled to the contrary. On June 26,
2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court resolved this circuit split and
reversed the Sixth Circuit’s ruling. Observing that this case law in the federal
appellate courts had “helped to explain and formulate the underlying principles”
relevant to the Court’s analysis, the Court (in a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy) held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples “may
exercise the fundamental right to marry” in all states and that “there is no lawful
basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in
another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”2
As requested by this volume’s editors, I apply these three frameworks to
particular legal, political, and policy controversies. I offer three examples—
corresponding to the three branches of government: the legislative, executive,
and judicial—where prominent religious leaders have identified threats to
religious liberty.3 The first example is the New York legislature’s enactment of
the Marriage Equality Act, which allows same-sex couples to marry. Religious
leaders criticized the law both for its alleged departure from a true
understanding of marriage and its purported failure to provide adequate
religious exemptions (e.g., for public officials who refuse to take part in samesex marriage). The second is the decision by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
stop defending DOMA in legal lawsuits challenging its constitutionality,
including in the Windsor litigation. A prominent address on religious liberty
stated that the DOJ had “attacked DOMA as act of ‘bias and prejudice,’ akin to
racism, thereby implying that churches that teach that marriage is between a
man and a woman are guilty of bigotry.”4 I look at arguments made by religious
organizations in defense of DOMA and religious liberty in “friend of the court”
briefs filed in the Windsor litigation. Windsor itself triggered new warnings about
threats to religious liberty, fortified by charges in the strongly worded dissents
that the majority had branded supporters for traditional marriage “bigots” and
“superstitious fools” who had “hateful hearts” and “acted with malice.”5
My third example is the ruling by the federal district court, in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger (2010), that Proposition 8 (hereafter Prop 8), a ballot initiative
that amended California’s constitution after its high court ruled that same-sex
couples must be allowed access to civil marriage, violated the US constitution
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because it lacked any legitimate purpose and instead rested on private moral or
religious views.6 Religious critics sharply criticized both the Perry opinion and
the Ninth Circuit opinion affirming it. Because the Supreme Court, in
Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013), declined to reach the merits and instead vacated
the Ninth Circuit opinion (for technical reasons discussed later in this chapter), I
focus primarily on the federal district court opinion.
(p.90) All three examples helpfully raise the larger issues of religion in the
public square and what religious liberty means in a pluralistic constitutional
democracy. These issues are likely to remain at the forefront of public discourse
and to arise in new legislative and judicial battles in the post-Obergefell
landscape, in which all states must allow same-sex couples to marry and
recognize those marriages. Even before the Court’s ruling, in the wake of public
criticism that “religious freedom restoration acts” passed in Indiana and
elsewhere to protect religious business owners from “supporting” same-sex
marriages instead protect discrimination and “bigotry,”7 several prominent
religious leaders issued a new statement about the need to “talk about religious
liberty.”8 They argue that “civic harmony” is impossible “when basic moral
convictions and historic religious wisdom rooted in experience are deemed
‘discrimination.’ ”9 The rhetoric in the Obergefell dissents that the majority’s
opinion threatens religious liberty and will be used “to vilify Americans who are
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy” has already featured in recent
statements about risks to religious freedom and calls for “constitutional
resistance” to Obergefell and will likely feature in new controversies.10 The
three frameworks offered in this chapter may provide a helpful way to approach
these conflicts.

I. Frameworks
A. Framework 1: Congruence and Conflict

Congruence and conflict refers to the tension I noted earlier between two ideas
about the relationship between the institutions of civil society and the
institutions of government. The first idea envisions a comfortable congruence
between norms and values fostered by nongovernmental associations and those
inculcated by government, or at least that the institutions of civil society are
“mediating associations” that cultivate a “whole range of moral dispositions,
presumably supportive of political order.”11 The second contemplates that the
values and virtues generated by nongovernmental institutions may conflict with
political values and virtues. How does this tension apply to the evident clash
between religious liberty and marriage equality?
Some religious opponents of same-sex marriage assert that it will harm the
institution of marriage and society if civil law redefines marriage so that it
clashes with religious understandings of marriage. For example, on November
20, 2009, a group of prominent Christian clergy, religious leaders, and scholars
released “The Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience.”12 Drafted
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by Professor Robert P. George (a prominent political and constitutional (p.91)
theorist at Princeton University), Professor Timothy George (Beeson Divinity
School, Samford University), and the late Chuck Colson (Chuck Colson Center
for Christian Worldview), it identifies three areas under supposed threat: life,
marriage, and religious liberty.
The Declaration invokes congruence when it articulates the religious roots of the
correct “objective” understanding of marriage. Citing biblical verses in Genesis
(2:23–24) and Ephesians (5:32–33), it contends: “marriage … is the first
institution of human society,” the foundation of all other institutions.13 The
“impulse to redefine marriage” to recognize same-sex marriage, the Declaration
states, “reflects a loss of understanding of the meaning of marriage as embodied
in our civil and religious law and in the philosophical tradition that contributed
to shaping the law” (5).
It is a mistake, the Declaration asserts, to believe that as a matter of “equality or
civil rights,” homosexual relationships should be recognized as marriage: “No
one has a civil right to have a non-marital relationship treated as a
marriage” (6). Those disposed toward homosexual sexual conduct are entitled to
compassion and respect as human beings “possessing profound, inherent, and
equal dignity” (5). However, they are not capable of marriage because of its
“objective reality” as a “covenantal union of husband and wife” and its “sexual
complementarity”: the union of one man and one woman is “sealed, completed,
and actualized by loving sexual intercourse in which the spouses become one
flesh, not in some merely metaphorical sense, but by fulfilling together the
behavioral conditions of procreation” (6). Thus, it is not “animus” or “prejudice”
that leads the Declaration’s signatories to “pledge to labor ceaselessly to
preserve the legal definition of marriage,” but “love” and “prudent concern for
the common good” (7). This statement no doubt was aimed at some state court
opinions (such as the Massachusetts high court, in Goodridge v. Department of
Human Resources [2003]) rejecting traditional rationales for excluding same-sex
couples from civil marriage as, in fact, manifestations of constitutionally
impermissible prejudice or animus.14 The Declaration contends that when new
definitions of marriage in civil law disturb this congruence between religious
and civil law, “genuine social harms follow,” including threats to religious and
parental liberty (6). The Manhattan Declaration, as I discuss below, filed a friend
of the court brief in the Prop 8 and DOMA litigation.15
In What Is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense, Manhattan Declaration
author Robert George, along with Sherif Girgis and Ryan Anderson, repeat the
same definitional argument that same-sex couples are not capable of achieving
the bodily union that is marriage’s “objective reality,” although without an
explicit reference to religious beliefs.16 The authors also filed a brief in the Prop
8 and DOMA litigation, to which I return in Section IV.17
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(p.92) B. Framework 2: Distinction between Civil and Religious Marriage

The Manhattan Declaration rests upon an evident congruence between the “civil
and religious law” of marriage. Civil and religious understandings of marriage,
however, differ in many ways. Most fundamentally, while some religious
opponents of same-sex marriage stress that God is not only the creator of the
institution of marriage, but also the third party to every marriage, family law
students in the United States routinely learn that the state creates the institution
of civil marriage, sets the terms, and is a third party to every marriage—and
divorce.18 This state role is vividly clear in the famous Massachusetts same-sex
marriage decision, Goodridge, when the Supreme Judicial Court explains:
Simply put, the government creates civil marriage. In Massachusetts, civil
marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its name
implies: a wholly secular institution. No religious ceremony has ever been
required to validate a Massachusetts marriage.
In a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two
willing spouses and an approving State. While only the parties can
mutually assent to marriage, the terms of the marriage—who may marry
and what obligations, benefits, and liabilities attach to civil marriage—are
set by the Commonwealth. Conversely, while only the parties can agree to
end the marriage (absent [one spouse’s] death or a [void] marriage), the
Commonwealth defines the exit terms.19
Other state high courts have made similar declarations about civil marriage and
the state’s role as a third party.20 To recognize that civil marriage is a
government-regulated institution is not to deny that, historically, Christian
teachings about marriage, particularly the ecclesiastical law of England, have
shaped family law in the United States (for example, the law of separation and
certain grounds for annulment and fault-based grounds for divorce).21 Thus, the
phrase “wholly secular institution” might be misleading to the extent it suggests
religious and secular understandings of marriage are wholly distinct.22 As the
late Lee Teitelbaum observed, “for most of American history … the law of
marriage was consistent with and supported—if not created—by the views of
dominant religious communities.”23 For example, “in the middle of the twentieth
century,” the Catholic Church’s view “that artificial contraception is immoral”
was “enforced or supported by law in some states.”24 Nonetheless,
contemporary family law differs markedly from—indeed conflicts with—certain
religious conceptions of marriage (including the conjugal model set forth in the
Manhattan Declaration) that stress that marriage must (p.93) be open to
procreative acts, that men and women have complementary roles to play as
spouses and parents, and that marriage—a permanent union—may not be
dissolved.
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Consider just three significant trends in family law: (1) the constitutionalization
of family law, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), which recognized
the right of a married couples to use contraceptives; (2) family law’s gender
revolution (spurred by the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence of
the 1970s and 1980s), which eradicated state laws requiring different roles for
husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, and shifted from a view of marriage
as a hierarchical relation rooted in gender complementarity to a partnership of
equals rooted in gender neutrality; and (3) the liberalization of divorce law,
reflected in the so-called no-fault divorce revolution, which began in California
in 1969, but quickly spread to the rest of the country (and, finally, to New York
several years ago). All three of these trends are in tension with certain religious
conceptions of marriage.
Many other trends in family law and society have shaped marriage law and
social practice in directions that are at odds with many religious conceptions of
marriage and family. For example, in marriage equality litigation, the US
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) appealed to the “antiquity and nearuniversality” of marriage laws, attributing the one man–one woman definition to
the state’s interest in “channeling the [unique] sexual and reproductive faculties
of men and women into the kind of sexual union where responsible childbearing
will take place and children’s interests will be protected.”25 This argument about
the unique role of marriage in channeling heterosexual procreation and parental
investment, however, is in tension with the evolution in the law of parentage in
many states and in some federal laws, which: (1) recognize parental rights and
impose parental responsibilities outside of marriage, both through new formal
statuses, such as civil unions and domestic partnerships for same-sex (and
sometimes opposite-sex) couples and through doctrines such as de facto
parenthood; (2) permit adoption by unmarried individuals and couples
(including, in some states, same-sex couples); and (3) allow the use of assisted
reproductive technology to create children—and parental status—within and
outside of marriage. States vary with respect to how far they have adopted or
rejected these trends. However, all these ways of permitting and even
supporting non-marital parenthood are pertinent to claims about the unique,
channeling role of marriage.
My point here is that secular law already differs sharply in certain respects from
religious understandings of marriage, a departure of which conservative
religious critics of civil marriage law are keenly aware. One example is covenant
marriage. Louisiana legislator Katherine Shaw Spaht felt called to propose
“covenant marriage” to instantiate an ideal of marriage in keeping with
Christian (p.94) traditions of permanence and mutual sacrifice.26 Even so,
because her new model would still permit divorce (although on a more restricted
basis), Spaht found that Louisiana’s Catholic bishops could not support it.27 A
second example comes from marriage equality litigation. In their friend of the
court brief submitted in support of Prop 8 and DOMA, George, Anderson, and
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Girgis contrast the “conjugal model” of marriage that these laws rationally
advance with the “revisionist” model, acknowledging that “a revisionist view has
informed certain marriage policy changes of the last several decades.”28 They
contend that “[e]nacting same-sex marriage” would be “finishing what policies
like no-fault divorce began”; this would “finally replace the conjugal view with
the revisionist” and “multiply the marriage revolution’s moral and cultural
spoils, and make them harder than ever to recover.”29
As state definitions of marriage change to permit same-sex couples to marry, the
conflict between religious liberty and marriage equality arises in significant part
due to underlying disagreement over the “nature” of marriage: as law and
religion scholar Douglas Laycock explains, marriage simultaneously may be “a
personal relationship, a legal relationship, and a religious relationship.”30 While
“the secular side” sees marriage primarily as a “legal relationship” or
“committed personal relationship between the spouses,” “[c]ommitted religious
believers see the religious relationship as primary.”31 Accordingly, such believers
“see same-sex marriage legislation as the state interfering with the sacred,
changing a religious institution,” and, consequently, “[t]hey reject the change,
and they reject the state’s authority to make the change.”32 This rejection is
evident, as discussed later in this chapter, in some religious objections to New
York’s Marriage Equality Law.
C. Framework 3: The Role of Moral Argument and Moral Disapproval

Political philosopher Michael Sandel famously criticizes liberalism for exalting
choice without regard for the moral good for what is chosen. He contends that
liberalism leads to a public square denuded of religious arguments and
convictions. The issue of same-sex marriage, he contends, cannot be resolved
within the bounds of public reason but requires “recourse to controversial
conceptions of the purpose of marriage and the goods it honors.”33 While I
disagree with Sandel’s critique of liberalism, I agree with his valuable insight
that arguments about purposes and goods are key to the marriage equality
issue. However, as James Fleming and I explain elsewhere, arguments about
individual rights and about the goods and purposes of marriage both play a role
in judicial opinions recognizing marriage equality and are compatible with the
constitutional liberalism we support.34
(p.95) One alleged threat to religious liberty is that judges and the executive
have ruled out moral disapproval as a legitimate reason to uphold laws
excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage and have conflated moral
disapproval with bias, prejudice, and animus. How, religious critics ask, can this
possibly be correct? Isn’t law, as the Supreme Court once put it,35 constantly
based on morality? Later in this chapter, I will discuss the role of moral
disapproval in the federal constitutional challenges to DOMA and Prop 8.36 In
this section, I preview the relevant US Supreme Court jurisprudence. Religious
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critics have sharply criticized that jurisprudence from the outset, sometimes
anticipating its possible future use to support same-sex marriage.
Romer v. Evans (1996) held that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution
(Amendment 2), which had the effect of repealing several local laws that banned
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and prohibited “any
governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes,
regulations, ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state constitution is
first amended to permit such measures,” violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the US Constitution.37 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer contains several key
phrases that surface again and again in the constitutional challenges to Prop 8
and DOMA, as well as to restrictive state marriage laws. Justice Kennedy states
that Amendment 2 “withdraws from homosexuals, but not others, specific legal
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids
reinstatement of these laws and policies”; that it imposes a “broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group”; and that its “sheer
breadth” is “so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects” (631–
633). In another often-quoted passage, he states: “Laws of the kind now before
us raised the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected” (634). Quoting an earlier
Supreme Court case, Department of Agriculture v. Moreno (1973), he explains
that equal protection means, at minimum, that “a bare … desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest” (634).38 In a formulation that he draws from Louisville Gas & Electric
Co. v. Coleman (1928) and repeats in Windsor, Kennedy states, “[d]iscriminations
of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine
whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision” (633).39
This formulation suggests a more searching form of rational basis review, even
though Romer declined to find that homosexuality was a suspect classification,
triggering intermediate or strict scrutiny. Even so, it stressed that the legislative
classification must “bear a rational relationship to an independent and
legitimate end” to “ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law” (633). Amendment 2, Kennedy
(p.96) concludes, “confounds” this test—singling out a group of persons based
on a single trait and then disqualifying them from protection “across the board”
is “unprecedented in our jurisprudence” (633). The state of Colorado’s primary
rationale for Amendment 2 was “respect for other citizens’ freedom of
association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality” (635); another rationale was
“conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups” (635).
However, Kennedy concludes, the amendment’s breath is too far divorced from
these justifications to be credited. It “classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado
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cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws” (635).
In a memorable dissent, Justice Scalia accuses the majority of mistaking “a
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite,” countering that Amendment 2 is surely
constitutional as a “modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to
preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws” (636). Colorado long ago
had decriminalized sodomy. By contrast, Scalia points out that just ten years
earlier in Bowers v. Hardwick—a case the majority nowhere mentions, let alone
overrules—the Supreme Court upheld a state law imposing criminal punishment
on homosexuals for sodomy. In Scalia’s words: “If it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct” (641, emphasis in original). What’s more: “Surely … the
only sort of ‘animus’ at issue here [is] moral disapproval of homosexual conduct,
the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws
that we held constitutional in Bowers” (644). Amendment 2, he contends, is an
example of how a society that eliminated criminal punishment can nonetheless
continue to express “moral and social disapprobation” of homosexuality, and, in
doing so at the state level, counter successfully the “disproportionate political
power” of homosexuals who reside in “disproportionate” numbers in urban areas
(645–647). Scalia paints a picture of Coloradan voters exposed to “homosexuals’
quest for social endorsement,” which is happening not just in places like New
York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco but right there in the cities of Colorado.
Finally, Scalia accuses the majority of taking sides in the culture wars with the
Knights Templar (that is, with the views and values of the lawyer class) rather
than with the “villeins” (evidently, the people of Colorado who passed
Amendment 2 “to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored
by a majority of Coloradans” [652]).
Romer drew sharp criticism from conservative critics for usurping the political
process, limiting the use of law to preserve traditional morality, and possibly
opening the door to judicial imposition of same-sex marriage. In 1996, in (p.97)
a famous symposium in the journal First Things, Charles Colson, subsequent
coauthor of the Manhattan Declaration, warned of “kingdoms in conflict” and
that “the Court in Romer v. Evans effectively branded a bigot any citizen who
considers homosexuality immoral.”40 He predicted that, under Romer, the Court
would “easily find no compelling interest in confining marriage to a man and a
woman.”41 He also, as in the Declaration, discussed the problem of what
Christians should do when facing unjust laws.42 In the same First Things
symposium, Hadley Arkes, a key Congressional witness in support of DOMA,
passed in 1996, warned that Romer opened the door to judges imposing gay
marriage, which went contrary to the “natural teleology of the body.”43
Amendment 2 simply sought to ensure that “coercions of the law would not be
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used to punish those people who bore moral objections to homosexuality,” which
the Court now characterized as animus or blind prejudice.44 Romer, Arkes
argued, pronounced “the traditional moral teaching of Judaism and Christianity,
as empty, irrational, unjustified.”45 This rhetoric about branding defenders of
traditional marriage as bigots and prejudiced recurs, as I later discuss, in the
dissenting opinions in Windsor and Obergefell.
In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), in another opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court
officially overruled Bowers v. Hardwick and held that Texas’ law making samesex sodomy a crime was unconstitutional. This ruling implicitly invalidated any
remaining state anti-sodomy statutes. Lawrence is another critical component of
the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the weight of moral disapproval and
features in Kennedy’s subsequent opinions in Windsor and Obergefell. Romer’s
invalidation of class-based legislation born of animus features in Lawrence, in
which the Court emphasizes the “stigma” that the criminal statute imposes on
homosexuals. It concludes that the state “cannot demean [homosexual persons’]
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.”46 The Court acknowledges—as Bowers did—“that for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral” (571),
shaped in part by religious beliefs and respect for the traditional family.
Nonetheless, while “for many persons these are not trivial concerns but
profound and deep convictions,” Justice Kennedy (invoking Planned Parenthood
v. Casey’s famous language) states: “The issue is whether the majority may use
the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law. ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code’ ” (571). The Court said that it was not addressing
whether homosexual intimate relationships warranted official recognition
(impliedly, marriage).
Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, is even more explicit about the import of
Romer and about distinguishing the present case from a challenge to marriage
laws. First, invoking Romer, she states: “Moral disapproval of a group cannot be
a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause” (583).
(p.98) To Texas’ law she applies Romer’s conclusion about “rais[ing] the
inevitable inference” of “disadvantage … born of animosity toward” (583)
homosexual persons. By contrast to the statute upheld in Bowers (which she did
not join in overruling), the Texas law—on its face—only criminalized sodomy by
same-sex couples. Second, she distinguishes Texas’ law, which brands “one class
of persons as criminal based solely on the State’s moral disapproval of that
class” and conduct associated with it from a legitimate interest, “such as …
preserving the traditional institution of marriage” (585). In a crucial passage,
she says: “Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state
interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage
beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group” (585). Both proponents
and opponents of DOMA cited frequently to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence,
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albeit to argue different positions as to whether that law rested on more than
“moral disapproval.”47
Justice Scalia, in a fierce dissent, famously predicts the end of all morals
legislation in the wake of overruling Bowers. The Court in Bowers had stated:
“The law is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process clause, the
courts will be very busy indeed.”48 He also warns readers not to believe the
majority or O’Connor’s disclaimers about the marriage issue: after, all,
“ ‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ is just a kinder way of
describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.”49 He asks: if
“moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct” does not suffice as a “legitimate
state interest,” then on what basis could a state deny homosexuals the benefits
of marriage? “Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and
the elderly are allowed to marry.”50 This last assertion has been cited in support
of marriage equality, since encouraging “responsible procreation” features
prominently as an asserted rationale for limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples, who (unlike same-sex couples) can procreate accidentally.
As with Romer, conservative critics of Lawrence debated whether the likelihood
of a Supreme Court ruling favoring same-sex marriage “appeared to increase
exponentially.”51 They pondered whether O’Connor or Scalia would prove to
have the better argument with respect to whether the constitutionally legitimate
interest in preserving the traditional institution of marriage would be viewed in
later cases as something other than the constitutionally impermissible mere
“moral disapproval of same-sex relations.”52
Romer, in the context of Equal Protection, and Lawrence, in the context of Due
Process, exemplify what constitutional commentators describe as a more careful
or searching form of rational basis review, or, rational basis “plus” or “with bite.”
Such review, however, often does not expressly use the language of fundamental
rights, suspect classifications, and strict scrutiny. Romer and Lawrence, (p.99)
as I discuss later, provide a template for Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor. In
turn, Lawrence and Windsor are both building blocks for Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Obergefell, which holds that same-sex couples have a
fundamental right to marry in every state and that states must recognize their
valid out-of-state marriages.
With these three frameworks in mind, I now turn to three examples of an evident
conflict between religious liberty and marriage equality.

II. New York’s Marriage Equality Act
My first illustration of an evident conflict between religious liberty and marriage
equality is the New York legislature’s voting, in June 2011, to allow same-sex
couples to marry.53 My first two frameworks are pertinent. Religious critics
charge that the Marriage Equality Act (the Act) wrongfully departed from a
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religious conception of marriage and failed to afford adequate religious
exemptions. By contrast, some legislators who supported the bill did so after
wrestling with the relationship between religious and civil marriage and their
obligations as lawmakers.
A. Analysis of Arguments

The New York legislature passed the Act without any judicial ruling that it must
do so. Indeed, in Hernandez v. Robles (2006), the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that the state’s constitution did not require opening up civil marriage to
same-sex couples because encouraging heterosexuals to procreate responsibly
supplied a rational basis for providing the benefits and protections of civil
marriage to opposite-sex, but not same-sex, couples. However, the legislature
was free to do so if it chose.54
When the legislature approved the Act, the positive votes of Republican
lawmakers who had opposed previous bills were critical. I will offer some
illustrative examples of how these legislators articulated the relationship
between civil and religious marriage.55
Republican Senator Stephen Saland characterized the Act as addressing the
“dual issues of religious freedoms” and marriage equality.56 He explained that he
reasoned through the conflict between religious teachings about marriage and
his conviction about the “right thing” to do. He emphasized his own “rather
traditional background,” including his marriage of 46 years, as well as “being
raised by parents who preached to me the importance of tolerance, respect, and
acceptance of others” and “always to do the right thing.” His “intellectual and
emotional journey” ended with him defining “the right thing as treating all
persons (p.100) with equality, [including] within the definition of marriage.”57
After the vote, he stressed that he appreciated that both “those for marriage
equality and those who support the traditional view of marriage” have a “deep
and passionate interest” in the issue. He explained that “as a traditionalist, I
have long viewed marriage as a union between a man and a woman” and, as a
believer in equal rights, he initially thought “civil unions for same-sex couples
would be a satisfactory conclusion.” However, he came to believe that equality
required equal treatment as to marriage itself and that religious exemptions in
the Act would protect religious freedom (as discussed later).58
A second example is Republican Senator Mark Grisanti. Initially, he simply
opposed same-sex marriage, but felt obliged—as a lawmaker—to investigate: “As
a Catholic I was raised to believe that marriage is between a man and a woman.
I’m not here, however, as a Senator who is just Catholic. I’m also here with a
background as an attorney, through which I look at things and I apply reason.”59
After much research and thought, he concluded: “I cannot legally come up with
an argument against same-sex marriage.” He made a rights-based argument:
“Who am I to say that someone does not have the same rights that I have with
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my wife, who I love, or that have the 1,300-plus rights that I share with her? … I
cannot deny a person, a human being, a taxpayer, a worker, or people in my
district and across … the State of New York, and those people who make this the
great state it is, the same rights that I have with my wife.” Like Saland, he
concluded that civil unions “do not work,” but cause “chaos.”60 At the same
time, the bill’s religious protections for religious organizations were important to
him, as a Catholic.
The distinction between civil and religious marriage also featured in some
speeches by sponsors of the Act. Assembly-member Deborah Glick stated:
“everybody is entitled to their religious belief. But they are not, according to our
Constitution, entitled to impose those religious beliefs on others.” She quipped:
“when you take your oath of office, and declare, perhaps, by placing your hand
on a Bible, that you will uphold the constitution, you don’t place your hand on
the Constitution of the State of New York and swear to uphold the Bible.”
Stressing the personal cost to her and her same-sex partner of being denied
various benefits by the “civic institutions of this state,” Glick described civil
marriage as “the recognized and consistent shorthand that we all use to
recognize and acknowledge committed, loving relationships and the families that
exist within them.”61 This description helpfully identifies marriage’s role in
signaling that relationships deserve public recognition; that it is civic recognition
stresses the distinction between civil and religious marriage.
In responding to the argument by opponents of the bill that “we shouldn’t be
changing the institution of marriage, ‘which had existed for millennia,’ ”
Assemblyman Richard Gottfried noted the continual evolution of the institution
(p.101) of marriage and the sharp distinctions between marriage practices that
are part of “our own religious heritage” (such as polygamy) and contemporary
civil marriage. Indeed, adhering to certain biblical commandments concerning
marriage—such as taking a deceased brother’s wife as one’s second, third, or
fourth wife—“would be a criminal act in this state and … in every state.”62
By contrast, opponents of the Act warned that its new definition of marriage
departed from—and lacked congruence with—religious understandings of
marriage. Democratic Senator Ruben Diaz asserted: “[W]e are trying to redefine
marriage …. I agree with Archbishop Timothy Dolan when he said that God, not
Albany, has settled the definition of marriage a long time ago.”63 Diaz referred to
the “great truth[]” that “marriage is and should remain the union of husband
and wife” and asserted: “Same-sex marriage is a government takeover of an
institution that government did not create and should not define.”64
After passage of the Act, Archbishop Dolan, joined by his fellow bishops of New
York, reiterated the Catholic Church’s teaching that “we always treat our
homosexual brothers and sisters with respect, dignity, and love,” but “we just as
strongly affirm that marriage is the joining of one man and one woman in a
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lifelong, loving union that is open to children, ordered for the good of children
and the spouses themselves.” He asserted that “this definition cannot change,”
expressing worry that “both marriage and the family will be undermined by this
tragic presumption of government in passing this legislation that attempts to
redefine these cornerstones of civilization.” He urged a societal return to a “true
understanding of the meaning and the place of marriage, as revealed by God,
grounded in nature, and respected by America’s foundational principles.”65 This
stance assumes a necessary congruence between religious and civil definitions
of marriage. Further, it illustrates Laycock’s argument that religious opponents
of “same-sex marriage legislation” view it as “interfering with the sacred” and
“reject the state’s authority to make the change.”66 Subsequent to the
enactment of this law, for example, the USCCB released a statement that
“[m]arriage is a fundamental good that must be protected in every circumstance.
Exemptions of any kind never justify redefining marriage.”67
It merits mention that religious clergy and institutions were active on both sides
of the debate over the Act. Strong opposition by the Catholic Church contributed
to the defeat of prior bills. Commentators who analyzed the factors contributing
to the success, in 2011, of the Act found that one factor was the “concerted,
sustained efforts by liberal Christian and Jewish clergy to advocate for [same-sex
marriage] in the language of faith, to counter the language of morality voiced by
foes.”68 The fact that there was religious support for the bill made it “ ‘easier [for
legislators] to counteract the claim of religious conservatives who say there is
only one answer to this question.’ ”69 Such supporters drew (p.102) analogies
to the critical role of religious support in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70
B. The New York Act and the Religious Exemptions

The supporting statement for the Act provides a helpful clarification of the
relationship between civil and religious marriage: “[T]his bill grants equal
access to the government-created legal institution of civil marriage, while
leaving the religious institution of marriage to its own separate, and fully
autonomous, sphere.”71 The Act protects that sphere through expansive
exemptions, including not only the “well-established constitutional and statutory
principles that no member of the clergy may be compelled to perform any
marriage ceremony,”72 but also the freedom of religious institutions and
benevolent organizations to “choose who may use their facilities and halls for
marriage ceremonies and celebrations, to whom they rent their housing
accommodations, or to whom they provide religious services, consistent with
their religious principles.”73 They would enjoy exemptions from providing
“accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges related to the
solemnization or celebration of a marriage.”74 These exemptions evidently were
critical to passage of the Act, particularly for certain religious lawmakers
supporting the bill.75
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Whether or not religious exemptions are constitutionally required (beyond the
obvious clerical exemption) or should be provided through state religious
freedom restorations acts are matters of current controversy, as Robin Fretwell
Wilson elaborates in Chapter 6 of this volume. In other writing, I have argued
that exemptions may be justified as a prudential remedy, rooted in recognition of
religious and moral objections to extending marriage to same-sex couples.76
Such exemptions may prove to be a ladder to full, equal citizenship through
acceptance of same-sex marriage, particularly given the generational divide
concerning same-sex marriage.77 Even otherwise conservative young people
support same-sex marriage.78 As Laycock observes: “Support for same-sex
marriage is growing with extraordinary rapidity.”79 Tellingly, Laycock and
Wilson, both of whom have teamed with other legal scholars to write a series of
letters to urge the legislatures to include robust protection for religious liberty
—“marriage conscience protection”—argue that now is the time to “lock in”
exemptions because the next generation is likely to be willing to pass marriage
equality laws without them.80
Even so, for those who insist on congruence between civil and religious
definitions of marriage, lest government undermine marriage and the family,
religious exemptions are unlikely to be an acceptable solution. For example, the
2012 “open letter” from religious leaders, “Marriage and Religious Freedom:
Fundamental Goods That Stand or Fall Together,” declares that, (p.103)
because of the “grave consequences” that follow from altering the definition of
marriage, including threats to religious freedom, public officials should “support
laws that uphold the time-honored definition of marriage.”81 An accompanying
document prepared by the USCCB poses this question: “Let’s say religious
freedom could be fully or mostly protected by an exemption … would that then
justify the redefinition of marriage?” The USCCB explains why the answer must
be no:
In practice, such exemptions either address genuine concerns but do so
inadequately or address “red herring” concerns that are unlikely ever to
arise. However, no religious exemption—no matter how broadly worded—
can justify a supportive or neutral position on legislation to redefine legal
marriage. Such “redefinition” is always fundamentally unjust, and indeed,
religious exemptions may even facilitate the passage of such unjust laws.82
This approach strongly resists any change in civil law and does not view the
route of religious exemption as wise or defensible. By contrast, some law and
religion scholars—such as Wilson and Laycock—urge that the focus should not
be on a “total win” by either supporters or opponents of same-sex marriage.
Instead, religious conservatives should no longer seek to regulate other people’s
relationships, but instead secure protection of their own religious liberty. At the
same time, advocates of marriage equality should deem it more important “to
protect their own liberty than to restrict the liberty of religious conservatives”
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by insisting those with moral objections to their unions provide them goods and
services.83
New York’s law did not go as far as the robust “marriage conscience protection”
proposed by Laycock and Wilson. For example, it did not relieve public servants
of their duty to provide a license to applicants of the same sex who meet New
York’s eligibility requirements on the grounds that such marriages offend their
religious beliefs.84 Nonetheless, an elected town clerk’s refusal to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples because “God doesn’t want me to do
this”—and one couple’s formal objection to this refusal—have featured in
warnings of how redefining marriage threatens religious liberty (as in Bishop
Lori’s address).85 In this volume and elsewhere, Wilson argues that such public
servants should receive religious accommodation provided it does not impose a
hardship on same-sex couples seeking licenses.86 I do not believe a public
servant has a “right” to a general exemption, although she might decide as a
matter of conscience to resign rather than enforce what she views as an unjust
law. However, I do not object to Wilson’s idea of an office voluntarily organizing
itself—if it has the staffing to do so—to accommodate such religious beliefs
without persons seeking a license experiencing a direct refusal of service.87
(p.104) As this volume goes to press, the issue of whether public officials may
refuse to issue marriage licenses due to religious convictions is in the news
afresh, as prominent opponents of marriage by same-sex couples are legally
representing a Kentucky county clerk who was found in contempt of court—and
briefly jailed—for steadfastly refusing to issue any marriage licenses at all or to
permit her clerks to do so.88 Illustrating the perspective that civil and religious
definitions of marriage should be congruent, the clerk, Kim Davis, an Apostolic
Christian, has asserted that, “To issue a marriage license which conflicts with
God’s definition of marriage, with my name affixed to the certificate, would
violate my conscience… . [T]his is about marriage and God’s word.”89 Clerks in
other states similarly assert that “natural marriage cannot be redefined by
government.”90 Moral disapproval of such marriages is also a theme in such
appeals to conscience. Moreover, since Obergefell, some states have passed laws
expressly permitting public officials to refuse to perform marriage ceremonies if
they have “sincerely held religious objections.”91 Legal challenges brought to
those laws will likely provide a further context in which to examine the issue of
congruence and conflict.92
Returning to New York’s Act, it also does not exempt for-profit businesses
involved in providing goods and services (considered public accommodations)
from serving same-sex couples if the owners believed doing so violated their
religious or moral beliefs. This exemption survived challenge when the owners of
a farm advertised as open to the public for wedding ceremonies and receptions
declined a lesbian couple’s request to hold their wedding there because the
owners were Christian and “do not hold same-sex marriages … at the barn.”93
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The couple brought a complaint under New York’s Human Rights Law, alleging
that the farm was a “public accommodation” that unfairly discriminated against
them on the basis of sexual orientation. The owners countered that they were an
exempt “private business.” In 2014, an administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected
that argument, pointing to the farm’s “widespread marketing to the general
public,” encouraging members of the public to lease their facilities and use their
services. The fact that the owners resided in part of the farm did not render the
farm private, since the other areas were used “solely” for contracted events, like
weddings and receptions. The ALJ (recently affirmed on appeal) concluded the
owners were subject to the law and, had discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation, and awarded a fine of $10,000 and $1,500 to be paid to each
individual woman.94
Some commentators view this outcome as too high a cost for religious persons
engaged in commerce to pay; the farm owners subsequently stopped holding any
weddings and receptions. Laycock, for example, argues that religious believers
engaged in providing goods and services who have “deep moral objections” to
same-sex marriage should not have to provide those goods and services (p.105)
so long as their refusal does not significantly burden a same-sex couple’s ability
to obtain such goods and services (for example, if there are no or few other
providers of that service in the area).95 In the New York case, the couple alleged
the denial of service caused them “mental anguish,” they stopped looking for a
location for several months, and even then they were uncertain about looking in
the same area lest they encounter similar reactions.96 On the other hand, some
commentators (in my view, correctly) argue that this type of ruling helps to
ensure that businesses treat “all patrons with the dignity and respect they
deserve” and that the “cost” of opening up one’s business to the public is “that
you can’t discriminate.”97 This seems to be a strong sentiment in the firestorm of
reactions to Indiana’s recently proposed religious freedom restoration law,
which included a “wave of boycotts and criticisms by business, sports and
political leaders and other states.”98

III. DOMA
My second example of an evident conflict between religious liberty and marriage
equality concerns DOMA. Religious leaders criticized the decision by the
Department of Justice of the Obama Administration to cease defending DOMA
against constitutional challenges, stepping aside for Congress to do so, if it
wished. For example, Bishop Lori described this change of position as an
“attack” on DOMA that treated it “as an act of ‘bias and prejudice,’ akin to
racism, thereby implying that churches, which teach that marriage is between a
man and a woman, are guilty of bigotry.”99 Religious groups subsequently filed
friend of the court (amicus curiae) briefs in support of DOMA in United States v.
Windsor, in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Edith Windsor’s challenge
to DOMA. In this section, I recap the circumstances leading to the enactment of
DOMA and the arguments made in support of it. I recount the Obama
Page 18 of 58

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.
Subscriber: Boston University Libraries; date: 28 June 2022

Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, “Moral Disapproval,” and Tensions between
Religious Liberty and Equality
administration’s stance of ceasing to defend it, using my third proposed
framework—the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence about the role of moral
disapproval. I then highlight themes made in friend of the court briefs by
religious organizations in support of DOMA. I briefly discuss the Supreme
Court’s decision in Windsor, both Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and the
dissenting opinions.
A. The Enactment of DOMA

In 1996, Congress passed (and President Clinton signed) DOMA “to defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” in response to a “very particular
development in the State of Hawaii”—that “state courts in Hawaii appear[ed]
(p.106) to be on the verge of requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples.” The purpose of Section 2 of DOMA was to “protect the right
of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition
of same-sex unions,” and, thus, not be compelled to recognize any out-of-state
marriage between same-sex couples. Section 3 defined “marriage” and “spouse”
for purposes of federal law as referring “exclusively to relationships between
persons of the opposite sex.”100
At the time Congress enacted DOMA, no state in the United States allowed
same-sex couples to marry. In 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to do
so, after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Goodridge, ruled in
favor of a state constitutional challenge to Massachusetts’s marriage law
brought by several same-sex couples.101 Issued just months after Lawrence
overruled Bowers, the Goodridge opinion frequently drew on Lawrence in
articulating how human dignity, respect, liberty, and equality are at stake in
matters of sexual intimacy, marriage, and family.102 Within several more years,
several more states would allow same-sex marriage, as a result of either
constitutional litigation or legislative enactment.103 Yet more states (such as
New York) indicated they would recognize such marriages, even if they did not
(yet) allow them.104 Because of DOMA, same-sex couples and states encountered
practical problems when marriages, valid under state law, were not recognized
for purposes of federal law. Spouses or surviving spouses were ineligible for the
numerous federal benefits linked to marital status, such as, in Windsor, the
exemption from estate tax a surviving spouse enjoys. Lawsuits filed by same-sex
couples, surviving spouses, and the states themselves challenged Section 3 as
unconstitutional.105
B. The DOJ’s Changed Stance on DOMA’s Constitutionality

The Department of Justice initially defended DOMA, even though (as did
President Obama) it urged Congress to repeal it. On February 2011, the DOJ
changed direction, a shift criticized by some religious leaders as a threat to
religious liberty, because Attorney General Eric Holder attributed the motive for
DOMA to “bias and prejudice.”106 By letter, Holder informed the Speaker of the
House, Hon. John A. Boehner, that “after careful consideration, … the President
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of the United States has made the determination that Section 3 of [DOMA] … as
applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment,” and accordingly, that the
DOJ will not defend DOMA in the “new lawsuits” brought in the federal district
courts of Connecticut and New York.107 Holder and President Obama had
concluded that “classifications based on sexual orientation warrant heightened
(p.107) scrutiny and that, as applied to same-sex couples legally married under
state law, Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional” (2). If, however, the district
courts in the Second Circuit concluded that rational basis should be the
applicable standard for reviewing DOMA, the DOJ would “state that, consistent
with the position it has taken in prior cases, a reasonable argument for Section
3’s constitutionality may be proffered under that permissive standard” (6).
However, it would leave it to Congress to make any such defense. Subsequently,
Congress did so, through the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the US
House of Representatives.108
Why does Holder conclude that DOMA reflects “stereotype-based thinking and
animus” of the sort that the Equal Protection Clause guards against, and
suggests that it cannot survive the heightened scrutiny that is appropriate?
Holder turns to prior Supreme Court precedents identifying four factors109 that
indicate whether a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis is appropriate for
a classification. He finds that all four “counsel in favor of being suspicious of
classifications based on sexual orientation,” particularly “a significant history of
purposeful discrimination against gay and lesbian people, by governmental as
well as private entities, based on prejudice and stereotypes that continue to have
ramifications today” (2). He refers to Lawrence, noting that “until very recently,
states have ‘demean[ed] the[] existence’ of gays and lesbians ‘by making their
private sexual conduct a crime’ ” (2).110 With respect to the fourth factor
—“whether the characteristics distinguishing the group have little relation to
legitimate policy objectives or to an individual’s ‘ability to perform or contribute
to society’ ” (2)111—he observes that “recent evolutions in legislation” (such as
the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell), “community practices,” “case law” (such as
Romer and Lawrence), and social science “all make clear that sexual orientation
is not a characteristic that generally bears on legitimate policy objectives” (3).
Further, “there is a growing acknowledgment that sexual orientation ‘bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society’ ” (3).112 Although many
circuit courts had concluded that only rational basis review is necessary for
sexual orientation, he notes that many reasoned from analogy from Bowers, a
line of argument no longer available since Lawrence.
Holder identifies “moral disapproval” as a primary purpose of DOMA,
contending that “the legislative record underlying DOMA’s passage … contains
numerous expressions reflecting moral disapproval of gays and lesbians and
their intimate and family relationships—precisely the kind of stereotype-based
thinking and animus the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard
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against” (4). The House of Representatives’ Report accompanying DOMA (House
Report) similarly emphasizes moral disapproval, for example, that DOMA
properly reflects a moral conviction that traditional heterosexual marriage
better comported with “traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality,” while
same-sex (p.108) marriage “puts a stamp of approval … on a union that many
people … think is immoral” (4, n. 7).
He noted that the DOJ—when it was defending DOMA—had already disavowed,
in “numerous” legal filings, two rationales as “unreasonable”: responsible
procreation and child-rearing (3–4, n. 5).113 With respect to the latter, “as the
Department has explained … many leading medical, psychological, and social
welfare organizations have concluded, based on numerous studies, that children
raised by gay and lesbian parents are as likely to be well-adjusted as children
raised by heterosexual parents” (3–4, n. 5).
In support of his conclusion that DOMA fails intermediate scrutiny because the
Equal Protection Clause guards against the “stereotype-based thinking and
animus” it reflects, Holder refers to Romer (where the Court, without explicitly
using heightened scrutiny, rejected “the rationale that Amendment 2 was
supported by the ‘liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or
religious objections to homosexuality’)”; Cleburne (which ruled that “ ‘mere
negative attitudes, or fears’ are not permissible bases for discriminatory
treatment”); and Palmore v. Sidoti (which, in explaining why a court could not
award custody based on racial bias, stated: “Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect”)
(5).114
Many religious leaders have decried Holder’s decision not to defend DOMA and
his underlying analysis that DOMA’s stated purposes—including “moral
disapproval”—reflect animus and “stereotype-based thinking.” I believe,
however, that Holder’s critical evaluation of these rationales is sound, especially
given the evolution of the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence and its
overruling of Bowers, of the social science consensus about child outcomes and
family forms, and developments in state law about evolving understandings of
civil marriage. Holder’s evaluation says nothing to religious congregations about
having to perform or recognize such marriages. Instead, it is a conclusion that
the federal government lacks a sufficient reason, under a heightened scrutiny
standard, for not treating civil marriages that are valid under state law as valid
marriages under federal law. The only threat to religious liberty that I perceive
here is that religious opponents of extending civil marriage to same-sex couples
may no longer carry the day in terms of having their convictions about marriage
reflected in federal law.
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C. Windsor v. United States: Proceedings in the Lower Federal Courts

In Windsor v. United States, Edith Windsor, the widow of Thea Spyer,
successfully challenged Section 3 of DOMA in federal district court because,
under it, she did not qualify for the unlimited marital deduction from federal
estate tax and had (p.109) to pay $363,053 when, “according to her last will
and testament, Spyer’s estate passed for Windsor’s benefit.”115 Windsor and
Spyer had been in a “committed relationship” since shortly after they met in
1963, and, as Spyer’s health deteriorated, they married in Canada in 2007
(397).116 Spyer died in 2009 and, after paying the estate taxes, Windsor sued in
federal court, seeking a refund of the federal tax paid and a declaration that
Section 3 “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (397).
At the time they married, New York did not permit same-sex couples to marry,
but by 2009, the relevant year for tax purposes, “all three statewide elected
executive official[s]—the Governor, the Attorney General, and the comptroller—
had endorsed the recognition” of marriages by New York same-sex couples (such
as Spyer and Windsor) who validly married in other jurisdictions (398). As
discussed earlier, in 2011 the New York legislature passed the Marriage Equality
Act.
In 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court, becoming the second federal appellate court to strike down
Section 3.117 It did so applying intermediate scrutiny, the standard of review
urged by the DOJ and Edith Windsor (if the court did not move all the way to
strict scrutiny).118 While the federal district court (following the First Circuit)
read the Court’s precedents, particularly Romer, to support a “more exacting
rational basis review for DOMA,” the Second Circuit observed that the Supreme
Court “has not expressly sanctioned such modulation in the level of rational
basis review,” and that intermediate scrutiny was the more appropriate
standard.119
D. Friend of the Court Briefs before the Supreme Court: Marriage, Moral Disapproval,
and Religious Liberty

On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Windsor and
Hollingsworth v. Perry (the Prop 8 case). These intensely watched cases
generated numerous amicus curiae briefs filed on both sides by states, members
of Congress, medical and psychological organizations, bar associations,
professors, individuals, and, most significantly for this chapter, religious
organizations and leaders.120 In other writing, I have analyzed these briefs.121 In
this chapter, I highlight themes in briefs filed by religious amici relevant to the
relationship between civil and religious marriage and the evident conflict
between marriage equality and religious liberty.
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1. Arguments in Favor of DOMA and BLAG

(a) Defending Traditional Marriage: Congruence of Civil and Religious Law

Several amici who filed briefs in support of BLAG framed the litigation over
Section 3 as improperly shifting from the democratic to the judicial arena a (p.
110) societal debate over what marriage is and should be. They further argued
that the Constitution does not require one vision or the other and that is all the
more reason “the people,” not the judiciary, should decide. These arguments
stress the congruence between civil and religious understandings of marriage
and the importance of the polity getting marriage “right,” that is, of having a
truthful conception of marriage embodied in law.
Robert George, Sherif Girgis, and Ryan Anderson framed the debate over the
definition of marriage as between the “conjugal view” of marriage as a
“comprehensive union” of spouses “begun by commitment and sealed by sexual
intercourse… . by which new life is made,” and a “revisionist view,” in which
“marriage is essentially an emotional union, accompanied by any consensual
activity” and seen “as valuable while the emotion lasts.”122 They contended that
while the conjugal view “has long informed the law,” the revisionist view “has
informed certain marriage policy changes of the last several decades.”123 (As
noted earlier in this chapter, this suggests recognition of a growing lack of
congruence between civil and religious conceptions of marriage.) They warned
that the consequences of striking down DOMA, which affirms the conjugal view,
are serious. While prior legal developments in the direction of the revisionist
view (such as liberalizing divorce law) have already undermined marriage as an
institution, “[r]edefining civil marriage will obscure the true nature of marriage
as a conjugal union,” uniquely linked to procreation and childrearing, and, thus,
undermine—rather than strengthen—marriage’s “stabilizing norms,” to the
detriment of “spouses, children, and others.”124
The amicus brief filed by the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) and
several other prominent religious denominations similarly framed the issue as a
high-stakes debate over models of marriage.125 They explained their interest in
the litigation: “Faith communities have the deepest interest in the legal
definition of marriage and in the stability and vitality of that time-honored
institution” (1). The NAE brief elaborated two contrasting conceptions of
marriage:
The age-old, traditional understanding conceives of marriage as a union
between a man and a woman that is inherently oriented toward
procreation and childrearing and in which society has a profound stake. A
more recent conception views marriage as primarily a vehicle for affirming
and supporting intimate adult relationship choices, a vision that is not
inherently oriented toward uniting the sexes for the bearing and rearing of
children (2).
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The brief further asserted that the newer conception is a “radical break from all
human history,” because “gender itself is irrelevant. What matters most is public
endorsement of the adults’ chosen relationship, obtaining official status for (p.
111) that relationship, and the official approval that comes with such
endorsement and status” (11).
NAE further argued that Congress may act to protect a “valued moral norm” and
that “many congressional enactments reflect unmistakable moral and value
choices” (19). NAE also warned that “declaring DOMA void because it adheres
to traditional moral and religious beliefs would fly in the face of this Court’s
teaching that the Constitution ‘does not license government to treat religion and
those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as
subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique
disabilities’ ” (20).126 NAE argued for a form of neutrality toward religion:
“DOMA is entitled to be judged on its merits according to settled rules of law—
not on a more demanding standard born of suspicion toward religion, religious
believers, or their values” (21).
Amici often anchored their marriage-based arguments for DOMA to Justice
O’Connor’s statement, in Lawrence, that “ ‘other reasons exist to promote the
institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of the law.’ ”127 For
example, the Manhattan Declaration brief, after invoking Justice O’Connor’s
Lawrence concurrence, asserted that their position is not rooted in animus, but
on “sincere belief and sound public policy considerations,” since heterosexual
marriage “encourages and supports responsible procreation and childrearing,”
and “redounds to the health and well-being of societies in general.”128 The
Coalition for the Protection of Marriage similarly asserted that the
“overwhelming international consensus” that marriage should be reserved to
“opposite-sex couples while supporting same-sex couples through other rights
and legal mechanisms” was based “not on irrationality, ignorance, or animus
toward gays and lesbians but on considered judgments about the unique nature
and needs of same-sex couples and children.”129
The insistence on congruence is evident in the briefs of some amici who
appealed to religious and Biblical understandings of marriage in support of
Section 3’s preserving “traditional” marriage and warned of consequences if the
civil law of marriage departs sharply from religious conceptions of marriage.
Some amici resisted the very idea that civil and religious understandings of
marriage could or should be distinct. For example, the Coalition for the
Protection of Marriage asserted: “Although interacting with and influenced by
other institutions such as law, property, and religion, marriage in our society is a
distinct, unitary social institution and does not have two separate, independent
existences, one ‘civil’ and one ‘religious.’ ”130 The Manhattan Declaration brief
argued that the concept that societies give legal recognition to marriage to
“encourage and support responsible procreation and childrearing” is
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“remarkably similar to the Christian belief that through marriage man and
woman cooperate conjugally in the creative act of God Himself.”131
(p.112) Some amici also insisted that Congress could enact DOMA to defend
traditional notions of morality, including disapproval of homosexuality. For
example, Westboro Baptist Church argued at length that homosexuality (along
with adultery, abortion and the like) is such a serious sin that it will motivate
God to punish the United States by destroying it, similar to the Flood in Noah’s
time.132 The Foundation for Moral Law asserted: “From Biblical law and other
ancient law, through English and American common law and organic law, to
recent times, homosexual conduct has been abhorred and opposed; the idea of a
‘marriage’ based on such conduct never even entered the legal mind until very
recent times.”133 Thus, not only did “Congress’s passage of the federal definition
of marriage in DOMA [have] the force of that history behind it,” but it also
rested on “several present-day interests”—as “traditional marriage … began to
come under attack through the courts in 1993”—such as “defending marriage
and … traditional notions of morality.”134
(b) Protecting Religious Liberty and Avoiding a Clash of Rights

Amici supporting DOMA warned that as civil laws changed their definitions of
marriage, religious persons and groups adhering to traditional definitions would
face threats to their religious liberty. New civil marriage laws would create a
clash of rights. Thus, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argued that
“because so many major religious groups center their teachings regarding
sexual morality around opposite-sex marriage, changing the definition of
marriage itself … triggers a distinct set of religious liberty concerns.”135 For
example, “being forced to call a same-sex relationship a ‘marriage’ creates a
conflict of conscience for many religious organizations where ‘civil union’ or
‘domestic partnership’ would not” (29). DOMA, therefore, was a rational
response to two religious liberty conflicts caused by marriage equality laws:
First, objecting religious institutions and individuals will face an increased
risk of lawsuits under federal, state, and local anti-discrimination laws,
subjecting religious organizations to substantial civil liability if they choose
to continue practicing their religious beliefs. Second, religious institutions
and individuals will face a range of penalties from federal, state and local
governments, such as denial of access to public facilities, loss of
accreditation and licensing, and the targeted withdrawal of government
contracts and benefits (4).
The Becket Fund asserted that “DOMA and Prop 8 were rational responses to
court decisions that gave legal recognition to same-sex marriage without
addressing the significant church-state conflicts that would result” (2) from
“burdens imposed by … supposedly neutral, generally applicable laws” (29). (p.
113) This argument seems inapt as applied to Windsor, since New York enacted
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marriage equality through the legislative process and included religious
exemptions.
The Christian Legal Society, joined by Catholic Answers and the Catholic Vote
Education Fund, warned that classifying homosexuals as a suspect or quasisuspect class would compromise religious liberties, and “necessarily diminish
the ability of our nation’s religious individuals and communities to live according
to their faith.”136 If the Court created a “new suspect classification for sexual
orientation,” it would “take sides” in an already “broad and intense conflict
between the gay rights movement and religious liberty regarding marriage,
family, and sexual behavior” and “place millions of religious believers and
organizations at a potentially irreversible disadvantage in their efforts to
consistently live out their faith.”137
The Chaplain Alliance for Religious Liberty asserted that repealing DOMA would
impair “military religious liberty,” since “it is very likely that service members
who hold traditional religious beliefs on marriage and family will face, for the
first time, military policies and duties that sharply [sic] hostile to their
beliefs.”138 The brief predicted that chaplains and service members who
belonged to “faith groups that support traditional marriage” would face a stark,
forced choice between “their duty to obey God” and “their chosen vocation of
serving their country” if laws “affirming marriage as the union of one man and
one woman are invalidated as irrational and unconstitutional.”139
Other amici warned that a civil regime recognizing same-sex marriage would
create a new governmental orthodoxy at odds with religious liberty. For
example, the Manhattan Declaration brief asserted that “redefining marriage
imperils religious liberty and oftentimes requires that freedom of conscience be
sacrificed to the newly regnant orthodoxy.”140 A new marriage regime that
recognized same-sex marriage would “circumscribe[] the ability of the Christian
faithful to put their beliefs into practice” (15). The brief included various
examples, such as Christian adoption agencies shutting down because of their
refusal to place children with same-sex couples, religious parents’ inability to
remove their children from public school classes advocating marriage equality,
and Christian organizations having to end all medical insurance for employees’
spouses because they do not want to cover same-sex spouses (15–19). The brief
further contended that Christians would be limited in how they could educate
their children (17).
Some religious amici contended that their religious objections to same-sex
marriage were not animus and that for government to fail to give credence to
those objections infringed upon their religious liberty. For example, the Liberty,
Life and Law Foundation and North Carolina Values Coalition warned that
marriage equality would infringe upon the “moral code of behavior” typical of
religions, including the regulation of sexual conduct, with the (p.114) result
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that “[a] state mandate to affirm same-sex marriage would have an explosive
impact on religious persons who could easily treat all individuals with equal
respect and dignity but cannot in good conscience endorse or facilitate same-sex
marriage.”141 The Foundation further argued that “[a] person’s religiously
motivated refusal to recognize same-sex unions is not tantamount to unlawful
discrimination, nor is it irrational animosity,” and that, “[t]o hold otherwise
would exhibit callous disregard for religion.”142 The evident logic of the
Foundation’s argument is that the Constitution protects religious beliefs and
conduct, and, thus, morality based on religion provides a valid rationale for
opposing same-sex marriage. The Foundation analogized to case law crediting
conscientious religious beliefs in other contexts, concluding: “[t]he government
must avoid showing hostility to religion by refusing to acknowledge religious
motivation.”143
2. Arguments for Windsor’s Challenge to DOMA

Some religious amici filing in support of Windsor emphasized the distinction
between civil and religious marriage and that redefining the former did not
unconstitutionally burden the latter. They further pointed out that religious
exemptions were a means of ensuring religious liberty. For example, the brief
submitted by the Bishops of the Episcopal Church in California, New York, and
several other states, the Jewish Theological Seminary, and numerous other
religious groups noted a growing affirmation by religious faiths of the “dignity”
of same-sex relationships and family life:
The American religious panorama embraces a multitude of theological
perspectives on lesbian and gay people and same-sex relationships. A vast
range of religious perspectives affirms the inherent dignity of lesbian and
gay people, their relationships, and their families. This affirmation reflects
the deeply rooted belief, common to many faiths, in the essential worth of
all individuals and, more particularly, the growing respect accorded within
theological traditions to same-sex couples.144
The brief insists on the constitutional importance of the distinction between civil
and religious marriage:
Certain amici supporting reversal have argued that civil recognition for the
marriages of same-sex couples would alter a longstanding “Christian”
definition of “marriage.” But this and other religiously based arguments for
limiting civil recognition of marriage to different-sex couples cannot
constitutionally be given weight by this Court. (p.115) Crediting such
arguments would improperly both enshrine a particular religious belief in
the law—itself prohibited under the Establishment Clause—and implicitly
privilege religious viewpoints that oppose marriage equality over those
that favor it (5).

Page 27 of 58

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.
Subscriber: Boston University Libraries; date: 28 June 2022

Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, “Moral Disapproval,” and Tensions between
Religious Liberty and Equality
The brief then argues that “[e]liminating discrimination in civil marriage will not
impinge upon religious doctrine or practice,” since “[a]ll religions would remain
free—as they are today with nine states and the District of Columbia permitting
same-sex couples to marry—to define religious marriage in any way they
choose” (4). The brief first points out that “[t]he types of conflicts forecast by
certain other amici already can and sometimes do arise under public
accommodation laws whenever religiously affiliated organizations operate in the
commercial or governmental spheres,” and “[c]ourts know how to respond if
enforcement of civil rights laws overreaches to infringe First Amendment
rights” (4). “In any event,” the brief concluded, “the issue largely is irrelevant
here, because the couples affected by [DOMA] already are lawfully married
under state law” (4).
Other amici stressed that, under the Establishment Clause, religious groups do
not have “the right to have their religious views written into law so that others
may be compelled to follow them.”145 Addressing claims by amici that “their
‘religious liberty’ … would be violated if this Court confirms a right to legal
equality for gays and lesbians,” because of “their Bible’s condemnation of
homosexuality,” the American Humanist Association asserted that, “[b]ecause
the First Amendment forbids, rather than requires, any law solely grounded in or
codifying a religious ‘moral’ commandment, such objections can be accorded no
weight.”146
Other amici stressed the insufficiency of moral disapproval, even if rooted in
religious belief. Thus, the Anti-Defamation League acknowledged the importance
of religion in American life and that religious beliefs undoubtedly guided many
lawmakers. It explained, however, that, “under a line of cases including this
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, a law must be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest beyond the desire to disadvantage a group on
the basis of moral disapproval.”147
Some amici emphasized the civil nature of marriage law to assert that “the
humanity of gay citizens can be reconciled with respect for religious
freedom.”148 Utah Pride and many other statewide equality organizations
contended: “the Constitution guarantees both the right of gay people to be
treated as equals under civil law and the right of individuals and organizations
to hold beliefs about homosexuality in accordance with their own
consciences.”149 Appealing to the “secular context” and the “importance of
neutrality,” Utah Pride asserted that, “by affirming that all people—whether gay
or straight—are entitled to equal (p.116) treatment under the Constitution, this
Court can unify the country around our shared values of liberty and justice for
all.”150
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The American Jewish Committee (AJC) supported the state’s authority to
redefine civil marriage, but urged that broad protections of religious liberty
were necessary if the state did so.151 It voiced concerns similar to some amici
supporting DOMA, “agree[ing] that significant religious liberty issues will follow
in the wake of same-sex civil marriage” (10). It urged, however, that the issues
could be remedied if “each claim to liberty in our system … [is] defined in a way
that is consistent with the equal and sometimes conflicting liberty of
others” (11). Thus, there would be “no burden on religious exercise when the
state recognizes someone else’s civil marriage,” but there would be if “the state
demands that religious organizations or believers recognize or facilitate a
marriage in ways that violate their religious commitments” (3). The AJC saw
parallels between the gay rights movement and its own assertion of the need for
religious liberties:
Both same-sex couples and religious dissenters also seek to live out their
identities in ways that are public in the sense of being socially apparent
and socially acknowledged … Religious believers … claim a right to follow
their faith not just in worship services, but in charitable services provided
through their religious organizations and in their daily lives (15).
As did some religious amici supporting BLAG, the AJC identified a variety of
situations in which religious liberty might be compromised, including marriage
counseling by clergy and housing in religious colleges (23–25). As one way to
address these conflicts, the AJC also proposed that the Court reconsider its
controversial (5-4) decision Employment Division v. Smith (1990), so that
religious actors would be exempt from generally applicable laws that infringe on
their freedoms unless application of the statute can survive heightened scrutiny
(32–34). In my conclusion, I will return to this conflicting liberty framework,
which views exemptions as a way to accommodate the liberty at stake on both
sides.
E. United States v. Windsor: Justice Kennedy Completes a New Trio

On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court announced its ruling in United States v.
Windsor. In a 5-4 split, the majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,
held that Section 3 of DOMA was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty of the
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The opinion was
quickly hailed as a landmark by some and decried as judicial overreaching (p.
117) by others. Justice Kennedy said nothing explicit about the various religious
liberty arguments made by amici, but he did discuss the role of moral
disapproval. Romer and Lawrence provided a template for his opinion. Windsor
joined those two cases to make a trio of landmark rulings by the Court, all
authored by Justice Kennedy, about the status of gay men and lesbians. His
majority opinion struck down Section 3 without moving to the intermediate
scrutiny urged by the DOJ and the Second Circuit and instead confirmed—as the
district court in Windsor and the First Circuit discerned—that Romer supports a
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more searching form of rational basis review when there are “discriminations of
an unusual character.”
In explaining the injury that Section 3 inflicts, Justice Kennedy contrasts New
York’s attempt to confer dignity and respect on a class by changing its marriage
laws to allow same-sex couples to marry (and, prior to that, recognizing Edith
Windsor’s out-of-state marriage) with DOMA’s denial of such dignity and respect.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy concludes that “interference with the equal dignity of
same-sex marriages, … conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign
power” was DOMA’s “essence.”152 In support of this conclusion, he cites the
House Report, which appeals to defending “the institution of traditional
heterosexual marriage” and states that “DOMA expresses ‘both moral
disapproval of homosexuality and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better
comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality’ ” (2693).153
Citing Romer on the need for attentiveness to “discriminations of an unusual
character,” the majority states that DOMA’s “unusual deviation from the usual
tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” is “strong
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that
class” (2693). Section 3’s “avowed purpose and practical effect” are “to impose
a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma” on same-sex couples lawfully
married under the “unquestioned authority of the States” (2693).
Justice Kennedy concludes that BLAG’s arguments “are just as candid about the
congressional purpose to influence or interfere with state sovereign choices
about who may be married” (2693). Moreover, Section 3’s constitutionally
problematic purpose was to treat “as second-class marriages for purposes of
federal law” any same-sex marriages that states decided to recognize (2693–
2694). By contrast to the lower courts in Windsor, Justice Kennedy does not
mention, let alone evaluate, rationales such as “caution,” consistency and
uniformity of benefits, and responsible procreation and optimal childrearing. He
emphasizes a different aspect of uniformity that DOMA rejects: “the longestablished precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are
uniform for all married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject
to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next” (2692).
Evaluating DOMA’s effect, Justice Kennedy stresses its sweep: it controls “over
1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations” (2694). Given this (p.118)
broad scope of federal regulations bearing on marriage, “DOMA touches many
aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to the profound” (2694).
Articulating an aspect of marriage that I have elaborated elsewhere, the opinion
explains that marriage entails rights and responsibilities, both of which
“enhance the dignity and integrity of the person” (2694).154 Yet DOMA deprives
same-sex couples lawfully married under state law of such “rights and
responsibilities” (2694). DOMA’s creation of “two contradictory marriage
regimes within the same State” diminishes “the stability and predictability of
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basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and
protect,” and tells those same-sex couples that “their otherwise valid marriages
are unworthy of federal recognition” (2694). Without explicitly addressing
whether such couples have a federal constitutional right to marry, Justice
Kennedy appeals to Lawrence: “the differentiation demeans the couple, whose
moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects … and whose relationship the
State has sought to dignify” (2694).155 Several times, Justice Kennedy repeats
that DOMA “demeans” persons in “a lawful same-sex marriage” (2695). In a
passage frequently quoted in post-Windsor federal challenges to state laws, he
states that DOMA also “humiliates tens of thousands of children now being
raised by same-sex couples” (2695). He concludes: “The federal statute is
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage
and to injure those whom the State by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity” (2696). In a sentence that receives much parsing in the
dissents, he further adds: “This opinion and its holding are confined to those
lawful marriages” (2696).
F. The Windsor Dissents: Taking Sides and Branding Defenders of Traditional Marriage
“Bigots”

The dissenting justices in Windsor did not explicitly address arguments made
about the threat to religious liberty by striking down Section 3 of DOMA. They
did, nonetheless, criticize the majority in language that has fueled further
warning by religious leaders about threat to religious liberty if definitions of civil
marriage change. In dissent, Justice Alito argued that Edith Windsor was asking
the Court to “intervene” in a debate about the nature of marriage—namely,
between the “conjugal” view and the “consent-based view.” The Constitution, he
insisted, said nothing about the matter, and so it should be left to “the people.”
While he did not cite to any specific amicus briefs for these models, he referred
to George, Girgis, and Anderson’s book, What Is Marriage? (mentioned earlier)
for a “philosophical” account of the basis for the “conjugal” view (2718–2719).
Justice Alito warned that analogizing the one man–one woman requirement for
marriage to race or sex discrimination would “cast all those who cling to
traditional (p.119) beliefs about the nature of marriage in the role of bigots or
superstitious fools” (2717–2718).
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that “without some more convincing
evidence that the Act’s principal motive was to codify malice, and that it
furthered no legitimate governmental interests, I would not tar the political
branches with the brush of bigotry” (2696). Justice Scalia deployed the strongest
language, arguing that, instead of letting “the People decide” the marriage
debate, the Court had armed one side, and branded DOMA’s supporters as
“enemies of the human race,” “enem[ies] of human decency,” “members of a
wild-eyed lynch mob,” who had “hateful hearts,” and “acted with malice” (2708–
2710). He used racially inflected rhetoric, evident not only in the “lynch mob”
reference, but also in suggesting the majority’s inappropriate “condemnation” of
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Congress’s motive in enacting DOMA was akin to the Courts’ “scorn” directed at
“the legislature of some once-Confederate Southern state” (2707).
Justice Scalia also reiterated his view stated in dissent in Lawrence that “the
Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral and
sexual norms”; thus, moral disapproval was certainly a sufficient basis for
DOMA, since the Constitution neither required nor forbade approval of same-sex
marriage (2707). Finally, expressing disbelief at the majority’s statement that
the Court’s opinion and holding were “confined to those lawful marriages,” that
is, marriages permitted or recognized under state law but denied federal
recognition, Justice Scalia countered that the majority opinion, with a few simple
alterations, provided a template that those challenging state marriage laws
could easily use to assert that those state laws, like DOMA, were also motived by
the “bare … desire to harm” (2709–2710).
As readers of this chapter may know, Scalia has proven to be correct on the
frequent invocation of Windsor—including his dissent—by federal courts striking
down state marriage laws, although not all courts have gone the route of animus
or harm as a basis for such a ruling. Subsequent to Windsor, the focus is acute
on characterizing the position of defending the one man–one woman definition of
marriage and on whether and how motivation even matters. Some legal
commentators, for example, charge the Windsor majority with engaging in a
“jurisprudence of denigration” that attributes “malevolence” to Congress and—
by implication—to the “millions of Americans” who support state laws defending
traditional marriage and that “peremptorily dismisses and marginalizes” the
losers in the controversy over marriage “with unsubstantiated (and in their own
knowledge false) charges of hatefulnesses.”156
The Obergefell dissents, as noted earlier, echo the Windsor dissents in using the
rhetoric of bigotry to warn of threats to religious liberty. They do so even though
Justice Kennedy seemingly avoided a “jurisprudence of denigration” by
emphasizing that “[m]any who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that
(p.120) conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical
premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.”157 Thus,
dissenting Chief Justice Roberts charges that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
portrays any who do not “share” the Court’s evolved “understanding” that the
fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples as “bigoted” (2626).
Justice Scalia’s dissent characterizes the majority as contending that the age-old
one man–one woman definition of marriage “cannot possibly be supported by
anything other than ignorance or bigotry” (2630). Justice Alito warns that,
despite the majority’s “reassurances” about protecting conscience, those who
dissent publicly from the new “orthodoxy” will “risk being labeled as such and
treated as such by governments, employers, and schools” (2642–2643). It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a full analysis of how the Obergefell
opinion and the several dissents address the evident clash between the
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fundamental right to marry and religious liberty. A critical point for this chapter
is simply that Justice Kennedy follows the above statement about the sincerity of
those who oppose marriage by same-sex couples with a caveat about translating
those beliefs into civil laws that exclude such couples from the public institution
of marriage. It is not the religious beliefs themselves but the unequal treatment
by the state based on such beliefs that offends the Constitution. As Justice
Kennedy explains:
[W]hen that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public
policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State
itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own
liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in
marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would
disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this
right (2602).158
In stressing the harm that comes from exclusion, Justice Kennedy emphasizes
marriage as a great public institution, a uniquely important “two-person union”
that the states and the federal government support by attaching to it “an
expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities” (2601).

IV. The Fate of Prop 8 in Perry v. Schwarzenegger
My third example is the claim that Perry v. Schwarzenegger, a federal district
court ruling that Prop 8 (a ballot initiative that amended the California
constitution to enshrine the one man–one woman definition of marriage) violates
the federal constitution, threatens religious liberty, and precludes religious
citizens from (p.121) bringing their beliefs into the public square. A procedural
note will be helpful: In Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal
district court, drawing more criticism from religious leaders. The Supreme Court
granted review of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, but ultimately, in the muchanticipated decision of Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013), declined to reach the
merits of whether Prop 8 offended the federal constitution; instead, it concluded
that Prop 8’s proponents were private parties who lacked standing (under
Article III) to appeal the federal district court opinion and vacated the Ninth
Circuit opinion.159 The impact of Hollingsworth was to leave the lower federal
court ruling intact. Notably, Justice Kennedy (a Californian), in dissent, did not
say how he would have resolved the case on the merits, but he strongly
disagreed with the majority’s ruling on standing, arguing that “the very object of
the initiative system is to establish a law-making process that does not depend
upon state officials.”160 Shortly after the Court issued its opinion, California
state officials resumed issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
All three of my frameworks inform my analysis of Perry.
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A. The Enactment of Prop 8

What led to Prop 8 and the constitutional challenge to it? In 1999, California
became the first state to enact a domestic partnership law. By referendum in a
2000 election, California voters adopted Prop 22, which provides that “[o]nly
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”161
The California legislature steadily expanded California’s domestic partnership
law, in the face of Prop 22, culminating in the Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003.162 Beginning in 2005, when the Act took effect,
domestic partners had nearly all the legal incidents of civil marriage, without the
name.
In re Marriage Cases (2008) decided the question of whether, under California’s
constitution, the state must provide same-sex couples with access to civil
marriage. In a lengthy opinion, the California Supreme Court concluded that (1)
the fundamental right to marry protected by the state constitution’s due process
clause includes the right to marry a person of the same sex and (2) reserving the
status of marriage for heterosexuals, while limiting gays and lesbians to the
second-class domestic partnership status, constitutes unconstitutional
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the state
constitution’s equal protection clause.163 The court ruled that denying same-sex
couples official recognition of their intimate, committed relationships as
marriages denied them equal dignity and respect.164
Instead of resolving the matter, the high court’s opinion was a catalyst for the
campaign for Prop 8, a ballot initiative to amend California’s constitution by
defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman.165 Money poured
(p.122) into California from outside the state on both sides of the issue.
Religious organizations mobilized to support the ballot initiative. An instructive
example is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, where leaders called
upon Mormons to donate time and money to the campaign.166 “During the 2008
election season,” the First Presidency of the Church issued a statement “to be
read by bishops over the pulpit in California wards,”167 which explained:
The Church will participate with this coalition in seeking [the initiative’s]
passage. Local Church leaders will provide information about how you may
become involved in this important cause. We ask that you do all you can to
support the proposed constitutional amendment by donating of your means
and times to assure that marriage in California is legally defined as being
between a man and a woman. Our best efforts are required to preserve the
sacred institution of marriage.168
This move by religious leaders, as Robert Putnam and David Campbell put it, to
“draw a clear connection between theology and politics, and then issue a
directive to congregant, was exceptional and almost wholly unexpected,
according to many Mormons.”169 Nonetheless, given that “the preservation of
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the traditional family is a major focus of modern Mormonism,” the surprise was
not the church’s “stance” on Prop 8, but “how explicit and official that stance
became.”170 I offer this anecdote because it suggests the high stakes that
religious groups perceived in Prop 8, and the quoted appeal reflects a view of a
necessary congruence between civil and religious marriage.
B. Perry v. Schwarzenegger: The Inadequacy of Private Moral Views as a Basis for Prop
8

When “super lawyer” team David Boies and Ted Olsen challenged Prop 8 in
federal district court on behalf of same-sex couples, they submitted extensive
expert testimony and documentary evidence during a lengthy trial. The State of
California declined to defend Prop 8 in court, and the Supreme Court of
California advised that the proponents of Prop 8 were allowed to defend it. They
put on only a few witnesses. Following the trial, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker
issued a lengthy opinion, concluding that Prop 8 violated the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause of the US Constitution.171 His opinion contains
many findings of fact, citing to specific evidence, in support of his conclusions of
law (see 953–991, 993).
Most pertinent to this chapter are (1) Judge Walker’s findings about the role of
religious views about homosexuality in the campaign for Prop 8 and (2) his legal
conclusion that a “private moral view that same-sex couples are inferior (p.123)
to opposite-sex couples” is “not a proper basis” (1002) for Prop 8’s restricting
same-sex couples from access to civil marriage. On the first point, Walker
invoked testimony by expert witness Segura, who “identified religion as the chief
obstacle to gay and lesbian political progress” (985) and noted the “sheer
breadth” (955) of the coalition of religious groups forming the basis of Protect
Marriage (the group seeking to pass Prop 8). The Prop 8 proponents’ own expert
witness Paul Nathanson, who was deposed but did not testify, stated that
“religion lies at the heart of the hostility and violence directed at gays and
lesbians” (945). Segura noted that Katherine Young, a second expert for the
Prop 8 proponents who, again, was deposed but did not testify, “freely admits
that religious hostility to homosexuals plays an important role in creating a
social climate that’s conducive to hateful acts, to opposition to their interest in
the public sphere and to prejudice and discrimination” (986, paragraph 77[q]).
In support of his findings that religious opposition to homosexuality fueled the
Prop 8 campaign, Walker cited an advertisement, which asserted that “the 98%
of Californians who are not gay should not have their religious freedoms and
freedom of expression be compromised to afford special legal rights for the 2%
of Californians who are gay.”172
Turning to my second point, Walker found that the evidence shows conclusively
that “Prop 8 enacts a moral view that there is something ‘wrong’ with same-sex
couples.”173 The campaign, Walker found, appealed to the moral superiority of
opposite-sex couples. By contrast, in litigation, the Prop 8 proponents reframed
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their arguments because, he infers, they recognized that Prop 8 “must advance a
secular purpose to be constitutional” (931). Citing Lawrence, he stated that “the
state does not have an interest in enforcing private moral or religious beliefs
without an accompanying secular purpose” (930–931). In the litigation,
proponents defended Prop 8 on these four grounds:
1. Maintains California’s definition of marriage as excluding same-sex
couples;
2. Affirms the will of California citizens to exclude same-sex couples from
marriage;
3. Promotes stability in relationships between a man and a woman
because they naturally (and at times unintentionally) produce children;
and
4. Promotes “statistically optimal” child-rearing households; that is,
households in which children are raised by a man and a woman married
to each other (931).
The third argument is the responsible procreation argument, so central to other
attempts to defend state marriage laws (including in Obergefell) as well as
DOMA (as discussed earlier in this chapter).174 The optimal childrearing
argument also featured in the campaign.
(p.124) In assessing these arguments, Walker asked “whether any evidence
supports California’s refusal to recognize marriage between two people because
of their sex” and “whether any evidence shows California has an interest in
differentiating between same-sex and opposite-sex unions.”175 To both of these
questions, based on extensive testimony and documentary evidence, he
answered no: same-sex and opposite-sex couples were similarly situated with
respect to California’s interest in encouraging stable households and optimal
child-rearing. Thus, with those possible bases for Prop 8 ruled out, he framed
the remaining legal question: “whether the evidence shows Proposition 8
enacted a private moral view without advancing a legitimate government
interest” (932, 936, 973). His answer to and analysis of this final question
generated intense criticism by religious leaders for its approach to the role of
religion in public life and, in particular, in controversies over marriage.
What does Judge Walker mean by a “private moral view”? How does he
distinguish between a private moral view and legitimate governmental interest?
I will first focus on his evaluation of the irrelevance of gender to marriage and
child well-being and then turn to his lengthy focus on the campaign for Prop 8.
First, Walker reasons that the conviction that marriage must be between one
man and one woman turns on notions of gender complementarity rooted in
religious views. Thus, “Prop 8 amends the California Constitution to codify
distinct and unique roles for men and women in marriage” (975). Walker cites
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statements by Prop 8 supporters, contained in voter kits about God as the author
of gender difference and gender complementarity (975, paragraph 61). Are such
appeals as such out of bounds in the democratic process? The bigger problem, I
believe, is that this message does not fit California’s marriage law, which had
“eliminated all legally-mandated gender roles except the requirement that
marriage consist of one man and one woman” (998). The court bluntly states:
“the evidence shows” that the gender restriction that Prop 8 now “enshrines in
the California Constitution” is “nothing more than an artifact of a foregone
notion that men and women fulfill different roles in civic life” (998).
Second, the irrelevance of gender to child well-being is central to Walker’s
conclusion that Prop 8 rests only on a private moral view. The court makes
several affirmative findings about the factors contributing to child well-being,
declaring that “the gender of a child’s parent is not a factor in a child’s
adjustment,” that “children do not need to be raised by a male parent and a
female parent to be well-adjusted,” and that “having both a male and a female
parent does not increase the likelihood that a child will be well-adjusted” (980–
981). He observes that California law supports parenthood by gay men and
lesbians. His implicit argument is that while Prop 8 proponents assert, based on
personal and religious beliefs, that children need a mother and father, with (p.
125) distinct gender roles, in order for children to flourish, neither social
science literature nor California’s law of parentage supports this belief.
Therefore, it cannot be a legitimate interest for California to restrict marriage
premised on a view about gender complementarity as a precondition for optimal
child adjustment.
Third, he turns to the role of religion in the campaign and to the substance of
the campaign messages themselves. Religious critics charge that Walker
impugned the motives of California voters. Instead, Walker focuses on the role of
religious beliefs about homosexuality in proposing and campaigning for Prop 8,
that is, the public messages, not voters’ private motives. First, he finds:
“Religious beliefs that gay and lesbian relationships are sinful or inferior to
heterosexual relationships harm gays and lesbians” (985). In support, he appeals
both to deposition testimony by Prop 8 proponents’ experts as to the history of
religious prejudice against gay men and lesbians and its role in homophobia and
prejudice, as well as to many doctrinal statements by religious traditions about
homosexuality as a sin (e.g., that homosexual behavior is “a perversion of God’s
created order” and “a distortion of the image of God”) (985–987, paragraph 77).
The court relates the historical role of “stereotypes and misinformation” about
gays and lesbians in bringing about social and legal disadvantages. Walker cites
expert testimony noting parallels between historical campaigns against gay
rights and the campaign for Prop 8 (986–991). Experts for plaintiffs testified
about the difficulty of making progress in the legislative process if a group is
“envisioned as being somehow … morally inferior, a threat to children, a threat
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to freedom” (987, paragraph 78[h]). The Prop 8 campaign, the court repeats,
“relied on stereotypes to show that same-sex relationships are inferior to
opposite-sex relationships” (990, paragraph 80). He identifies messages about
the lesser value of same-sex relationships, the lack of similarity between samesex and opposite-sex couples, and that the former “do not deserve the full
recognition of society.” This, he says, is Prop 8’s “social meaning.” Prop 8
“places the force of law behind stigmas behind gays and lesbians” (973,
paragraph 58) and “reserves the most socially valued form of relationship
(marriage) for opposite-sex couples” (974, paragraph 60).
Prop 8 relied especially on “fears that children exposed to the concept of samesex marriage may become gay or lesbian” (988, paragraph 79) and that public
schools would instruct children about same-sex marriage, including the idea that
it is okay to think about marrying someone of the same sex (988–991). Notably,
some of the campaign rhetoric appealed to “tolerance” for the gay community,
but drew the line at “acceptance”—allowing that community to redefine
marriage for everyone else (988–989). Evidence showed that Prop 8 supporters
decided that a potent campaign message would be on “how this (p.126) new
‘fundamental right’ would be inculcated in young children throughout public
schools” (988, paragraph 79[d]). As Richard Garnett makes clear in this volume,
determining what “tolerance” requires in a pluralistic polity is critical in areas
where rights may collide.176 “Tolerance” as used in the Prop 8 campaign means
not criminalizing private sexual conduct and perhaps even allowing domestic
partnerships; it does not require official recognition of same-sex relationships as
marriages. The latter, in other words, is forced acceptance and also a forced
redefinition at odds with peoples’ religious understandings of marriage.
The court’s extensive findings about the basic similarities between opposite-sex
and same-sex couples lead it to reject the Prop 8 proponents’ argument that the
amendment advances a state’s interest in treating same-sex couples and
opposite-sex couples differently by “using different names for different things.”
The court reasons about the role of moral and religious views:
[P]roponents assume a premise that the evidence thoroughly rebutted:
rather than being different, same-sex and opposite-sex unions are, for all
purposes relevant to California law, exactly the same … The evidence
shows conclusively that moral and religious views form the only basis for a
belief that same-sex couples are different from opposite-sex couples. … The
evidence fatally undermines any purported state interest in treating
couples differently; thus, these interests do not provide a rational basis
supporting Proposition 8.177
The court then states an emphatic conclusion about the basic equality, and
perhaps Michael Sandel would say, equal moral worth, of same-sex couples:
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Many of the purported interests identified by proponents are nothing more
than a fear or unarticulated dislike of same-sex couples … The evidence
shows that, by every available metric, opposite-sex couples are not better
than their same-sex counterparts; instead, as partners, parents, and
citizens, opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples are equal …
Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection clause because it does not treat
them equally (1002).
Note that this conclusion about sameness—equal worth—is rooted in an
evidentiary showing, an assessment of “metrics.” This form of argument is that,
as we assess how these couples compare with respect to the purposes or goods
of marriage—intimate commitment, responsible parenting, and household
stability—we find that they are identical.
(p.127) Finally, in his legal conclusions, Walker relies on Romer and Lawrence
on the role of moral disapproval, stating: “a private moral view that same-sex
couples are inferior to opposite-sex couples is not a proper basis for legislation.”
Again, he marshals evidence supporting the inference that “Proposition 8 was
premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not as good as oppositesex couples” (1002). He explains:
Whether that belief [about comparative goodness] is based on moral
disapproval of homosexuality, animus toward gay and lesbians or simply a
belief that a relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better
than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief is not a
proper basis on which to legislate (1002).
In this passage, it bears emphasizing, Walker uses moral disapproval and animus
as alternative bases for the problematic belief: they need not both be present;
either is a constitutionally insufficient basis for Prop 8.
In support of his conclusion about animus, Walker cites Romer, where the
Supreme Court said of Colorado’s Amendment 2: “Laws of the kind now before
us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected” (1003).178 He also cites (as did
Holder) to Palmore’s famous statement that, “The constitution cannot control
[private biases] but neither can it tolerate them” (1003).179
On the moral disapproval point, Judge Walker analogizes to Lawrence, where, he
notes, the Supreme Court asked “whether a majority of citizens could use the
power of the state to enforce ‘profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles’ through the criminal code.” Here, Walker reasons, “the
question is whether California voters can enforce those same principles through
regulation of marriage licenses. They cannot.” The court further appropriates
Lawrence: “California’s obligation is to treat its citizens equally, not to ‘mandate
its own moral code.’ ” Walker continues, citing Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
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Lawrence: “ ‘Moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest,’ has
never been a rational basis for legislation.” Further invoking Supreme Court
precedents, the court reiterates: “Tradition alone cannot support
legislation” (1002).
In conclusion, the Perry court’s rejection of private moral views is premised on
an understanding of these moral views as, ultimately, based on animosity or
moral disapproval without any other supporting reason. Far from offering such a
reason, proponents of Prop 8 simply could not or did not counter the extensive
evidence about the ways in which same-sex and opposite-sex couples are
identical in the ways relevant to the state’s regulation of marriage.
(p.128) C. The Ninth Circuit’s Affirmance: Mere Disapproval Is Not Enough

Although the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance due to a
lack of standing by the Prop 8 proponents to appeal Judge Walker’s ruling, it is
useful to mention briefly the counterpart, in the Ninth Circuit opinion, to Judge
Walker’s discussion of the constitutional insufficiency of “private moral views” as
the basis for Prop 8. This aspect of its opinion bears directly on the issue of
religious freedom versus equality and the role of moral disapproval.
In evaluating possible rationales for Prop 8, the Ninth Circuit considers the
desire to “restore[] the traditional definition of marriage as referring to a union
between man and a woman.”180 This appeal to maintaining the traditional
definition of marriage was made, for example, in the amicus brief filed by the
USCCB and other religious groups. That brief argued that voters had many
legitimate secular reasons for supporting the law and that even the religious
reasons were not born of animus or hostility toward homosexuals, but of
theological convictions about the nature and purpose of marriage. However, the
Ninth Circuit cites Romer to dispose of the appeal to tradition: “tradition alone is
not a justification for taking away a right that had already been granted, even
though that grant was in derogation of tradition” (1092, emphasis in original).
Amendment 2 “could not be justified on the basis that it simply repealed positive
law and restored the ‘traditional’ state of affairs” (1092). The court also invokes
Lawrence and Loving v. Virginia: “The fact that the government majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save
a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack” (1093).181
Religious opponents of same-sex marriage loathe this kind of invocation of
Loving, arguing that it wrongly analogizes their stance to racial bigotry.
However, the court’s point is that history and tradition alone are not enough to
justify stripping same-sex couples of the right to marry. In Windsor, Kennedy
stated that “state laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect
the constitutional rights of persons,” citing Loving. Numerous federal courts,
ruling post-Windsor in favor of constitutional challenges to state marriage laws,
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have viewed Kennedy’s invocation of Loving as a “disclaimer of enormous
proportion.” In such jurisprudence, Loving not only serves as a vital precedent
for the fundamental right to marry, which includes the freedom to marry a
person of one’s choice, but also signals heightened scrutiny for evaluating
restrictions on that right.182
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Prop 8 enacted “nothing more or less than a
judgment about the worth and dignity of gays and lesbians as a class” (1094). It
assessed the campaign for Prop 8 differently than did the USCCB brief, drawing
(p.129) on the district court’s finding that stereotypes about the inferiority of
same-sex relationships featured prominently in the campaign for Prop 8. For
instance, the district court found that Prop 8 was motivated out of a “concern
that people of faith and religious groups would somehow be harmed by the
recognition of gay marriage” and “conveyed a message that gay people and
relationships are inferior, that homosexuality is undesirable and that children
need to be protected from exposure to gay people and their
relationships” (1094).
In an analogue to Judge Walker’s reference to a “private moral view,” the Ninth
Circuit concluded the Prop 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
“operates with no apparent purpose but to impose on gays and lesbians, through
the public law, a majority’s private disapproval of them and their relationships,
by taking away from them the official designation of ‘marriage,’ with its
societally recognized status. Prop 8 therefore violates the Equal Protection
Clause” (1095). The district and appellate courts did not find persuasive the
arguments that Prop 8’s proponents and amici made that there were legitimate
ends served by Prop 8. It is critical to appreciate that California had taken a step
toward equality with respect to the family life of gay men and lesbians—
according them, under domestic partnership law, the same benefits and
obligations accorded spouses under civil marriage, rendering appeals to
responsible procreation and optimal childrearing unpersuasive. In light of these
developments in family law and the messages of the Prop 8 campaign, neither
court found persuasive arguments for singling out this class and stripping away
one right—to use the name “marriage”—for a relationship otherwise treated like
marriage for nearly all purposes of state law.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have offered three frameworks that may be helpful in
evaluating claims that access by same-sex couples to civil marriage in the United
States threatens religious liberty: congruence and conflict with respect to the
relationship between civil society and government; the relationship between civil
and religious marriage; and the role of moral disapproval as a basis for law.
Although a way forward may be challenging, it is important to find a way to
achieve a mutual adjustment of equal basic liberties. In this regard, it is notable
that the Mormon Church, so prominent in the campaign against Prop 8, recently
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came out in support of anti-discrimination laws for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) persons, so long as such laws protect the rights of religious
groups.183 Even so, recent controversies over efforts to pass state religious
freedom restoration acts to protect business owners suggest that even
religiously motivated refusals to serve customers seem uncomfortably like forms
of discrimination rejected as part of an unjust past. On the one hand, defenders
of (p.130) religious liberty strenuously reject historical comparisons to
objections to interracial marriage and to public accommodations laws that would
bar racial discrimination in providing goods and services. They urge that robust
accommodation of religious conscience and exemption from anti-discrimination
laws are an appropriate concession to “surrender” by opponents of same-sex
marriage.184 On the other, when exemptions would reach beyond nonprofit
religious institutions to for profit businesses owned by religious persons, some
critics insist that such exemptions remind us uncomfortably of past forms of
discrimination in the public sphere and that present-day civil rights law cannot
allow such selective refusals.185
As this chapter goes to press, the most visible conflict over religious liberty,
post-Obergefell, concerns what the scope of religious freedom and
accommodation should be in the case of public officials whose duties include
issuing marriage licenses or performing marriage ceremonies. For example,
Ryan Anderson argues that “peaceful coexistence is possible” if states may
protect public officials like Kim Davis, the Kentucky clerk mentioned earlier in
this chapter, by enacting conscience-protection laws allowing them to “recuse
themselves” from issuing licenses or performing marriages.186 Already, the
inevitable references to the civil rights era are proliferating, with supporters of
Ms. Davis invoking the examples of civil disobedience by Dr. King and Rosa
Parks and critics calling her a “bigot” and comparing her to Governor George
Wallace and other recalcitrant public officials resisting court-ordered school
desegregation.187 For supporters of marriage equality (and here I include
myself), it is disturbing to see religious opponents invoke civil disobedience that
was aimed at ending discrimination and unequal treatment based on race in
public institutions and public accommodations to justify present-day refusals by
public officials to treat gay and lesbian citizens equally in access to—as
Obergefell describes marriage—an “important public institution.” Another
disturbing use of historical analogy is that, invoking President Lincoln’s
statements about the infamous Dred Scott case, some prominent conservative
religious critics of Obergefell have called upon “all federal and state
officeholders” to refuse to accept Obergefell as binding precedent except for the
plaintiffs immediately before the Supreme Court and “to recognize the authority
of states to define marriage, and the right of federal and state officeholders to
act in accordance with those definitions.”188 On the view of such conservatives,
because of the “grave” consequences of Obergefell, including the vilification of
believers in traditional marriage (as predicted by Justice Alito), public office
Page 42 of 58

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.
Subscriber: Boston University Libraries; date: 28 June 2022

Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, “Moral Disapproval,” and Tensions between
Religious Liberty and Equality
holders should justifiably assist, legally and politically, “anyone who refuses to
follow Obergefell. Another view of the matter is that—to quote Justice Scalia’s
earlier warning on the risk of an overly robust view of the free exercise of
religion that would trump civil law—“to permit this would make the professed
(p.131) doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land and, in
effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”189
The full implications of Obergefell for how to resolve constitutional commitments
to the fundamental right to marry and to the free exercise of religion await
further exploration. However, in closing, if one is mindful of the distinction
between civil and religious marriage, then the words of one federal district
judge upholding a challenge to Florida’s marriage law may be apt:
Liberty, tolerance, and respect are not zero-sum concepts. Those who
entered opposite-sex marriages are harmed not at all when others,
including these plaintiffs, are given the liberty to choose their own life
partners and are shown the respect that comes with formal marriage.
Tolerating views with which one disagrees is a hallmark of civilized
society.190
Notes:

This chapter is an expanded and updated version of a paper originally prepared
for the conference, “Religious Freedom and Equality: Emerging Conflicts in
North America and Europe,” held at Magdalen College, Oxford University, April
11–13, 2012. I am grateful to Georgetown University’s Religious Freedom
Project and to Kellogg College, Oxford University for including me in the
conversation. Thanks also to Timothy Samuel Shah, Jack Friedman, and Melissa
Proctor for editorial comments. I thank BU law librarian Stefanie Weigmann and
BU law student Jessica Lees for help with research. I also thank the BU
Department of Theology for affording me a chance to present this draft while I
was a Faculty Fellow in the Religion Fellows Program. Because this chapter was
substantially completed before the US Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges on June 26, 2105, I briefly indicate the relevance of my analysis to that
decision and to religious liberty issues in the post-Obergefell landscape, but
leave a full evaluation to later work.
(1.) United States v. Windsor, 570 US __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
(2.) Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2604–2605, 2608
(2015). Appendix A to Justice Kennedy’s opinion, “State and Federal Judicial
Decisions Addressing Same-Sex Marriage,” provides a list of these federal
appellate and district court opinions. Ibid., 2608. In DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d
388 (6th Cir. 2014), the Sixth Circuit reversed federal district court rulings that
struck down as unconstitutional state laws in Kentucky (Bourke v. Beshear, 996
F. Supp. 2d 542 [W.D. Ky 2014]), Michigan (DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d
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757 [E.D. Mich. 2014]), Ohio (Obergefell v. Wymslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 [S.D.
Ohio 2013]), and Tennessee (Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 [M.D. Tenn.
2014]) that barred same-sex couples from marrying and/or barred recognition of
their out-of-state marriages. These several cases were consolidated before the
Supreme Court under the name Obergefell v. Hodges.
(3.) See Most Rev. William E. Lori, “Address on Religious Liberty,” (presented at
the general assembly of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Baltimore, Maryland, November 14–16, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/about/
leadership/usccb-general-assembly/2011-november-meeting/archbishop-lorireligious-liberty-november-2011-address.cfm; Rev. John Flynn, “The End of
Religious Liberty?” Crisis Magazine, November 7, 2011, http://
www.crisismagazine.com/2011/the-end-of-religious-liberty (reporting Archbishop
Dolan’s examples of the New York marriage law and the Justice Department’s
“attack on DOMA”); Joan Frawley Desmond, “Bishops Fight Threats to Religious
Liberty,” National Catholic Register, October 17, 2011, http://
www.ncregister.com/site/article/bishops-fight-threats-to-religious-liberty; also
see Archbishop Timothy Dolan’s letter to US Bishops, September 29, 2011,
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/dolan-letter-onreligious-liberty.pdf.
(4.) Lori, “Address on Religious Liberty.”
(5.) United States v. Windsor, 570 US __, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2702–2711 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); 2717–2718 (Alito, J., dissenting); 2696 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
(6.) Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
(7.) For a criticism of Indiana’s law, see “In Indiana, Using Religion as a Cover
for Bigotry,” New York Times, March 31, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/31/opinion/in-indiana-using-religion-as-a-cover-for-bigotry.html?_r=0;
also see Monica Davey and Mitch Smith, “Indiana Governor, Feeling Backlash
from Law’s Opponents, Promises a ‘Fix,’” New York Times, March 31, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/politics/indiana-governor-mike-pencefeeling-backlash-from-religious-laws-opponents-promises-a-fix.html.
(8.) Charles J. Chaput, et al., “Now Is the Time to Talk about Religious Liberty,”
Public Discourse, April 3, 2015, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/
2015/04/14748/.
(9.) Ibid.
(10.) Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
For example on October 8, 2015, the American Principles Project (founded by
Professor Robert P. George) quoted Justice Alito’s prediction about vilification in
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its “Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges.”
https://americanprinciplesproject.org/founding-principles/statement-calling-forconstitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-v-hodges% E2%80%AF/.
(11.) Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of
Pluralism in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 41. On
congruence, again see Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, 36–41. For an oftencited account of civil society as mediating institutions, see Peter Berger and
Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in
Public Policy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1977). I have
discussed this idea of civil society as “seedbeds of civic virtue” extensively in my
own work, but for a useful introduction, see Mary Ann Glendon and David
Blankenhorn, eds., Seedbeds of Virtue: Sources of Competence, Character, and
Citizenship in American Society (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1995).
(12.) Robert P. George, Timothy George, and Chuck Colson, “Manhattan
Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience,” November 20, 2009, http://
www.manhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/
Manhattan_Declaration_full_text.pdf.
(13.) Robert P. George, et al., “Manhattan Declaration,” 4.
(14.) For reference to “prejudice,” see Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). For reference to “animus,” see Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999).
(15.) Brief for Manhattan Declaration as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
(16.) Robert George, Sherif Girgis, and Ryan Anderson, What Is Marriage? Man
and Woman: A Defense (New York: Encounter Books, 2012).
(17.) Brief for Robert P. George, Sherif Girgis, and Ryan T. Anderson as Amici
Curiae Supporting Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal), Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
US __, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) & Windsor, 133 S. Ct. (Nos. 12-144 & 12-307).
(18.) See Douglas E. Abrams, et al., Contemporary Family Law, 4th ed. (St. Paul,
MN: West Academic Publishing, 2015).
(19.) Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
(20.) See In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
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(21.) See generally John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage,
Religion, and Law in the Western Tradition (Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox Press, 1997).
(22.) See Perry Dane, “A Holy Secular Institution?” Emory Law Journal 58 (2009):
1123–1194 (challenging the notion that marriage is a “wholly secular
institution”).
(23.) See Lee E. Teitelbaum, “Religion and Modernity in American Family Law,”
in American Religions and the Family: How Faith Traditions Cope with
Modernization and Democracy, Don S. Browning and David A. Clairmont, eds.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 229.
(24.) Douglas Laycock, “Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars,” University of
Illinois Law Review 2014, no. 3 (2014): 851.
(25.) Brief for United States Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners and Supporting Reversal at 6, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 US __, 133
S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
(26.) Katherine Shaw Spaht, “Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social
Commentary and Legal Implications,” Louisiana Law Review 59 (1998): 63–130.
(27.) Ibid., 76 n. 49 (describing a statement from The Catholic Bishops of
Louisiana recognizing that the required divorce instruction under Covenant
Marriage would “confuse or obscure the integrity of the Church’s teaching and
disciple” because it is “contradictory to Church teaching and mandated by this
state law”).
(28.) Brief for Robert P. George, et al., 5.
(29.) Ibid., 6.
(30.) Laycock, “Religious Liberty,” 848.
(31.) Ibid.
(32.) Ibid.
(33.) Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2009), 253–254.
(34.) James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights,
Responsibilities, and Virtues (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013),
176–204.
(35.) Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US 186, 196 (1986).
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the role of moral disapproval, see Linda C. McClain, “From Romer v. Evans to
United States v. Windsor: Law as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amendment
2 and the Defense of Marriage Act,” Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 20
(2013): 351–478.
(37.) Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620, 628 (1996) (quoting the Colorado Supreme
Court’s construction of Amendment 2 in Evans v. Romer, 854 P. 2d 1280, 1284–
1285 [Colo. 1993]).
(38.) Quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 US 528, 534 (1973).
(39.) Quoting Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 US 32, 37–38 (1928).
(40.) Charles W. Colson, “Kingdoms in Conflict,” First Things, November 1996,
http://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/11/006-the-end-of-democracy-kingdomsin-conflict. The symposium is called “The End of Democracy? The Judicial
Usurpation of Politics.”
(41.) Charles W. Colson, “Kingdoms in Conflict.”
(42.) Ibid.
(43.) Hadley Arkes, “A Culture Corrupted,” First Things, November 1996, http://
www.firstthings.com/article/1996/11/005-the-end-of-democracy-a-culturecorrupted.
(44.) Ibid.
(45.) Ibid.
(46.) Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 578 (2003).
(47.) McClain, “From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor,” 432–436,
440–441.
(48.) Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US 186, 196 (1986).
(49.) Lawrence, 539 US at 601.
(50.) Ibid., 604–605.
(51.) Peter Sprigg, “Does Lawrence v. Texas Imply a Right to Same-Sex
Marriage?” Family Research Council Blog, August 6, 2010 (reprinting 2004
column), http://www.frcblog.com/2010/08/does-ilawrence-v-texasi-imply-a-rightto-same-sex-marriage/.
(52.) Sprigg, “Does Lawrence v. Texas Imply a Right to Same-Sex Marriage?”
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is codified as Marriage Equality Act, NY Domestic Relations §10-a (2011).
(54.) Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E. 2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
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Liberty, 199–205.
(56.) Remarks by Senator Saland, New York Senate Transcript, June 24, 2011,
6100, http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24-2011.
(57.) Remarks by Senator Saland, 6107.
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25, 2011, http://www.nysenate.gov/print/105811 (accessed January 24, 2015).
(59.) Remarks by Senator Grisanti, New York Senate Transcript, June 24, 2011,
6128, http://open.nysenate.gov/transcripts/floor-transcript-062411v1txt.
(60.) Remarks by Senator Grisanti, 6129–6130.
(61.) Deborah Glick, Remarks on Marriage Equality Vote, June 15, 2011 (my
transcription from video clip), http://assembly.state.ny.us/mem/?
ad=066&sh=video (accessed October 5, 2011).
(62.) Richard Gottfried, Remarks on Marriage Equality Legislation, June 15,
2011 (my transcription from video clip), http://assembly.state.ny.us/mem/
Richard-N-Gottfried/video/ (accessed October 5, 2011).
(63.) Remarks by Senator Diaz, New York Senate Transcript, June 24, 2011,
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(accessed January 24, 2015).
(64.) Ruben Diaz and Michael Long, “If the NY Senate Passes Gay Marriage, It’s
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www.nationalreview.com/corner/270218/if-ny-senate-passes-gay-marriage-itsrepublicans-who-will-take-heat-ruben-diaz-michael (accessed January 27, 2015).
(65.) “Statement of the Bishops of New York State on Same-Sex ‘Marriage’
Vote,” June 24, 2011, http://www.nyscatholic.org/2011/06/statement-of-thebishops-of-new-york-state-on-same-sex-marriage-vote/ (accessed January 27,
2015).
(66.) Laycock, “Religious Liberty,” 848.
(67.) United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Bishop Corlieone Expresses
Grave Disappointment over NY Bill Redefining Marriage,” press release, June
28, 2011, http://www.usccb.org/news/2011/11-131.cfm.
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(70.) Ibid.
(71.) New York Marriage Equality Act, A08354, Memorandum (2011), http://
assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A08354&term=2011&Memo=Y
(accessed January 24, 2015).
(72.) A08354 Memo, “Purpose.”
(73.) A08354 Memo, “Statement in Support.”
(74.) New York Marriage Equality Act, § 10-B, http://www.assembly.state.ny.us/
leg/?default_fld=&bn=A08354&term=2011&Summary=Y&Text=Y.
(75.) Danny Hakim, “Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage,” New York
Times, June 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/nyregion/religiousexemptions-were-key-to-new-york-gay-marriage-vote.html; also see Christopher
W. Dickson, “Inseverability, Religious Exemptions, and New York’s Same-Sex
Marriage Law,” Cornell Law Review 98 (2014):181, 182–186 (discussing the
importance of the religious exemptions to securing the necessary votes to pass
the Marriage Equality Act).
(76.) See Public Rights/Private Conscience Project of the Columbia School of
Law to Interested Parties, “Proposed Conscience or Religion-Based Exemptions
for Public Officials Authorized to Solemnize Marriages,” memorandum,
November 5, 2014 (on file with author). The memo explores the constitutionality
of proposed conscience or religion-based exemptions for public officials
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(77.) For elaboration, see Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty, Chapter 6.
(78.) Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion
Divides and Unites Us (New York: Simon and Shuster Paperbacks, 2012), 401–
406.
(79.) Laycock, “Religious Liberty,” 867.
(80.) These letters are available at the Mirror of Justice blog, http://
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Religious News Service, August 19, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/religion/farm-owners-fined-for-saying-no-to-lesbian-wedding/
2014/08/19/1cfe5ca2-27dd-11e4-8b10-7db129976abb_story.html.
(95.) Laycock, “Religious Liberty,” 879. Also see Robin Fretwell Wilson, et al. to
Gov. John Baldacci, “Religious Liberty Implications of S.P. 384,” May 1, 2009,
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/sp-384-me-letter-to-governor.pdf (in which
the authors seek “marriage conscience protection”).
(96.) McCarthy v. Liberty Ridge Farm, 11.
(97.) See, e.g., “NYCLU Victory: Wedding Venues Cannot Discriminate against
Same-Sex Couples,” NYCLU, August 14, 2014, http://www.nyclu.org/news/nycluvictory-wedding-venues-cannot-discriminate-against-same-sex-couples (quoting
NYCLU director Donna Lieberman); Bailey, “Farm Owners Fined” (quoting Adam
Winkler).
(98.) Davey and Smith, “Indiana Governor, Feeling Backlash.”
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(99.) Lori, “Address on Religious Liberty,” 5.
(100.) Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. Rep. 104-664, 104th Cong. 2d Sess, at 2.
(101.) Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
(102.) Ibid., 958–959.
(103.) At the time the US Supreme Court reviewed Edith Windsor’s challenge to
DOMA, the majority opinion noted that eleven states and the District of
Columbia allowed same-sex couples to marry. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013).
(104.) See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398–400 (S.D.N.Y.
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(105.) See, e.g., Massachusetts v. US Dept. of Health and Human Services, 682
F.3d 1, 6–7, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2012) (detailing lawsuits challenging Section 3
brought by Massachusetts couples and by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
affirming lower court ruling finding Section 3 unconstitutional).
(106.) John Flynn, “The End of Religious Liberty.”
(107.) Attorney General Eric Holder to Rep. John Boehner, “Letter from the
Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage
Act,” February 23, 2011, 1.
(108.) This is a bit of a misnomer since the two Democrats in this five-member
group declined to participate in defending DOMA.
(109.) The four factors are: “(1) whether the group in question has suffered a
history of discrimination; (2) whether individuals ‘exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group’; (3) whether
the group is a minority or is politically powerless; and (4) whether the
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objectives or to an individual’s ‘ability to perform or contribute to society.’ ”
Ibid., 2.
(110.) Quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 578 (2003).
(111.) Quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 438 US 587, 602–603 [1987]; City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 441–442 (1985).
(112.) Quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US 677, 686 (1973).
(113.) Quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 13.
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448, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 US 429, 433 (1984).
(115.) Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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(119.) Ibid., 180–181.
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www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/12-307.html; also see
Supreme Court Information, US v. Windsor, www.supremecourt.gov/
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support of Windsor, Brief of Amici Curiae Family and Child Welfare Law
Professors Supporting Respondents, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), as well as amicus briefs filed by this group in lower court proceedings in
the DOMA litigations.
(121.) McClain, “From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor,” 430–460.
This section of the chapter incorporates some of that analysis.
(122.) Brief for Robert P. George, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (Addressing the Merits and
Supporting Reversal) at 5–6, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 US __, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) and Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Nos. 12-144 & 12-307).
(123.) Ibid., 5.
(124.) Ibid., 15.
(125.) See Brief for National Association of Evangelicals, et al., as Amici Curiae
Supporting Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of
Representatives (Addressing the Merits), Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(126.) NAE brief is quoting Board of Education of Westside County Schools (Dist.
66) v. Mergens, 496 US 226, 248 (1990), which is in turn quoting McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 US 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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(132.) See Brief for Westboro Baptist Church as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party (Suggesting Reversal) at 13–20, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
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Merits) at 29, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
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Education as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group (Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal) at 4, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(137.) Ibid.
(138.) Brief for Chaplain Alliance for Religious Liberty, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (Addressing the Merits &
Supporting Reversal) at 3–4, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(139.) Ibid., 4–5.
(140.) Brief for Manhattan Declaration at 3–4, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
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(141.) Brief for Liberty, Life, and Law Foundation and North Carolina Values
Coalition as Amici Curiae Supporting Hollingsworth and Respondent Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group (Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal) at 16,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(142.) Ibid., 17.
(143.) Ibid., 15–16.
(144.) Brief for the Bishops of the Episcopal Church in the States of California,
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York, Vermont, and Washington and the District of Columbia, et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 3, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(145.) Brief for the American Humanist Association and American Atheists, Inc.,
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents (Addressing the Merits) at 4,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(146.) Ibid.
(147.) Brief for the Anti-Defamation League, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent Edith Windsor at 19, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. (citing Lawrence v. Texas,
539 US 558, 574–575 [2003]).
(148.) Brief for Utah Pride Center, Campaign for Southern Equality, Equality
Federation and Twenty-Five State-Wide Equality Organizations as Amici Curiae
at 30, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(149.) Ibid.
(150.) Ibid.
(151.) See Brief for the American Jewish Committee as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Individual Respondents (On the Merits) at 3–4, Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
(152.) Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
(153.) Quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, 12–13 (1996).
(154.) See Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty, 190–205 (elaborating a view
of marriage as securing rights and responsibilities and allowing various
substantive moral goods).
(155.) Citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 558 (2003).
(156.) Steven D. Smith, “The Jurisprudence of Denigration,” UC Davis Law
Review 48 (2014): 677, 700.
(157.) Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
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(159.) Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 US __, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
(160.) Ibid., 2674.
(161.) Prop 22 (codified as Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 [2000], and held
unconstitutional by In re Marriage Cases 183 P.3d 384, 453 [Cal. 2008]).
(162.) In re Marriage Cases at 413, 414–416.
(163.) Ibid., 446, 452.
(164.) For an analysis of this case, see Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty,
190–199.
(165.) See Cal. Const. Art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman
is valid or recognized in California”).
(166.) Nicholas Riccardi, “Mormons Feel the Backlash over Their Support of
Prop. 8,” Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2008 (accessed January 27, 2015),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/17/nation/na-mormons17.
(167.) Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion
Divides and Unites Us, pbbk. ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), 365.
(168.) First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
“Preserving Traditional Marriage and Strengthening Families,” letter to Church
leaders in California, June 29, 2008, http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/
california-and-same-sex-marriage.
(169.) Putnam and Campbell, American Grace, 365.
(170.) Ibid.
(171.) Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930–932 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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(172.) “Honest Answers to Questions Many Californians Are Asking about
Proposition 8,” ProtectMarriage.com, advertisement, November 2, 2008, https://
ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/evidence/PX2153.pdf.
(173.) Perry, 704 F. Supp. at 1002.
(174.) Indeed, in his Obergefell dissent (2613), Chief Justice Roberts explains the
origin and purpose of marriage as “ensuring that children are conceived by a
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mother and father committed to raising them in the stable conditions of a
lifelong relationships.”
(175.) Perry, 704 F. Supp. at 932, 935, 956, 963.
(176.) Richard Garnett, “Wrongful Discrimination? Religious Freedom,
Pluralism, and Equality” (this volume).
(177.) Perry, 704 F. Supp. at 1001.
(178.) Quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620, 634 (1996).
(179.) Quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 US 429, 433 (1984).
(180.) Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P. 3d at 76 [2009]).
(181.) Quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 577–578 (2003) and citing Loving
v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967).
(182.) See, e.g., Bishop v. U.S., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1279 (N.D. Okla. 2014),
aff’d, Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F. 3d 352 (4th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Bishop).
(183.) Daniel Burke, “Mormon Church Backs LGBT Rights—With One
Condition,” CNN.com, February 23, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/27/us/
mormon-church-lgbt-laws/.
(184.) Ross Douhat, “The Terms of Our Surrender,” New York Times, March 1,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/opinion/sunday/the-terms-of-oursurrender.html?_r=0 (urging compromise).
(185.) Ibid. See also Terry Kleeman, letter to the editor, New York Times, March
7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/opinion/the-holdouts-on-same-sexmarriage.html (critiquing Douhat; asking if Jim Crow laws were “an acceptable
accommodation to the religious beliefs of white supremacy” and asserting that
“fortunately, by the time we got around to legalizing interracial marriage, we
had had enough” and “no one was permitted to discriminate against interracial
couples” lest they face a civil rights prosecution).
(186.) Ryan T. Anderson, “We Don’t Need Kim Davis to Be in Jail,” New York
Times, September 7, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/opinion/we-dontneed-kim-davis-to-be-in-jail.html.
(187.) See, e.g., Jeremy Grey, “Is Kim Davis the New Rosa Parks or George
Wallace,” http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/
is_kim_davis_the_new_rosa_park.html.
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(189.) Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). In view of Justice
Scalia’s repeated critiques of Obergefell as anti-democratic and trampling the
religious beliefs of the majority, some commentators have recently argued that
Justice Scalia supported a “majoritarian theocracy.” Richard J. Posner and Eric J.
Segall, “Justice Scalia’s Majoritarian Theocracy,” New York Times, December 2,
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/opinion/justice-scalias-majoritariantheocracy.html.
(190.) Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
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